Narrative:

This airport, for quite some time, has and continues to present a 'clear and present danger' to air crews and their passenger -- particularly for non hub aircraft. 3 arrival clearance changes -- with the assumption (by ATC) that we had previously been cleared for the changes by the controllers, and confirmation was only given when questioned by us. Controller vectored us directly towards departing traffic, and ordered us to increase our rate of descent so as to place us -- altitude and course wise -- into a position resulting in a TCASII RA, that we complied with. Initially cleared for a visual approach to runway 30L, and cleared to land, when in the vicinity of 1100 ft AGL tower suddenly stated 'cleared for a visual approach to runway 30R, contact tower on XXX.' this is ridiculous -- and very unsafe -- even in good WX conditions -- retune the ILS to runway 30R, then switch displays for raw data, then switch to a different tower frequency while traveling at 3 mi per min on short final, in addition to the normal and obvious attention load to monitor the overall safety of the flight and monitor the PF. Immediately upon nosewheel touchdown at about 110 KIAS. This tower controller gave us several taxi instructions, including which exit to use, plus a hold short clearance. In between runways, on ground control, ATC requested we expedite across runway 30L -- traffic on short final. We declined as it was too close and we were too far away, and after all the other problems encountered on this arrival, declined and held short. On the ramp, an airport housekeeping truck failed to yield to our aircraft taxiing on the line attempting to safely reach our gate. This airport, and the surrounding airspace, is operated in an extremely haphazard and negligent crisis control manner on a regular basis, and will be the site of a future ATC induced tragedy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: F100 COMPLAINS OF T75, STL TWR AND STL ARPT RAMP SAFETY OPS.

Narrative: THIS ARPT, FOR QUITE SOME TIME, HAS AND CONTINUES TO PRESENT A 'CLR AND PRESENT DANGER' TO AIR CREWS AND THEIR PAX -- PARTICULARLY FOR NON HUB ACFT. 3 ARR CLRNC CHANGES -- WITH THE ASSUMPTION (BY ATC) THAT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN CLRED FOR THE CHANGES BY THE CTLRS, AND CONFIRMATION WAS ONLY GIVEN WHEN QUESTIONED BY US. CTLR VECTORED US DIRECTLY TOWARDS DEPARTING TFC, AND ORDERED US TO INCREASE OUR RATE OF DSCNT SO AS TO PLACE US -- ALT AND COURSE WISE -- INTO A POS RESULTING IN A TCASII RA, THAT WE COMPLIED WITH. INITIALLY CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 30L, AND CLRED TO LAND, WHEN IN THE VICINITY OF 1100 FT AGL TWR SUDDENLY STATED 'CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 30R, CONTACT TWR ON XXX.' THIS IS RIDICULOUS -- AND VERY UNSAFE -- EVEN IN GOOD WX CONDITIONS -- RETUNE THE ILS TO RWY 30R, THEN SWITCH DISPLAYS FOR RAW DATA, THEN SWITCH TO A DIFFERENT TWR FREQ WHILE TRAVELING AT 3 MI PER MIN ON SHORT FINAL, IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL AND OBVIOUS ATTN LOAD TO MONITOR THE OVERALL SAFETY OF THE FLT AND MONITOR THE PF. IMMEDIATELY UPON NOSEWHEEL TOUCHDOWN AT ABOUT 110 KIAS. THIS TWR CTLR GAVE US SEVERAL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, INCLUDING WHICH EXIT TO USE, PLUS A HOLD SHORT CLRNC. IN BTWN RWYS, ON GND CTL, ATC REQUESTED WE EXPEDITE ACROSS RWY 30L -- TFC ON SHORT FINAL. WE DECLINED AS IT WAS TOO CLOSE AND WE WERE TOO FAR AWAY, AND AFTER ALL THE OTHER PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED ON THIS ARRIVAL, DECLINED AND HELD SHORT. ON THE RAMP, AN ARPT HOUSEKEEPING TRUCK FAILED TO YIELD TO OUR ACFT TAXIING ON THE LINE ATTEMPTING TO SAFELY REACH OUR GATE. THIS ARPT, AND THE SURROUNDING AIRSPACE, IS OPERATED IN AN EXTREMELY HAPHAZARD AND NEGLIGENT CRISIS CTL MANNER ON A REGULAR BASIS, AND WILL BE THE SITE OF A FUTURE ATC INDUCED TRAGEDY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.