Narrative:

Flight was inbound to sea and in control of sea approach control. Spring WX in area included rain showers and high winds, resulting in 25-30 KT xwinds and gains/losses of 15 KTS airspeed reported by previous aircraft, as well as on the ATIS report. Just as we were making the base-to-final turn, approach handed us off to sea tower and in the same transmission said to 'maintain 170 KTS to boeing' meaning boeing field airport about 2 mi ahead. This was a very busy moment, as a tremendous amount of wind drift was blowing us onto the final approach course (path). I was focusing my attention on this to ensure the first officer was going to roll out on the extended centerline of runway 16R, as another aircraft to our left was approaching runway 16L from the north. Meanwhile, the first officer was trying to slow to the 170 KTS advised by the controller, and began calling for flap extensions and setting speeds in the speed window on the MCP. It was a little turbulent, and the airspeed began the fluctuations of +/-15 KTS as advertised by ATIS, etc. We finished configuring and continued to the runway and landed. It was when we turned off on the high speed turnoff between runway 16R&left that the first officer gave the aircraft back to me to taxi to the gate. He looked down to the radio panel and said 'I don't think we ever made it to tower.' I had that sinking feeling of realization in my stomach when I realized he was right! He contacted ground and that controller said 'go back to tower and hold short of the left for departing traffic.' (no tone of alarm in his voice, whatsoever!) tower was called, and the tower controller said 'continue holding short.' he then crossed us over runway 16L and we contacted ground per his instructions. Ground merely cleared us to our gate with no apparent concern over the event, as far as we could tell. Clearly, I must develop a new technique to ensure a landing clearance has been obtained, that is immune to distrs. The one I had been using for yrs (not turning on the outboard landing lights until cleared to land) let me down today. Perhaps a mental check, at say 1000 ft AGL, would be better. Note: the absence of a landing clearance was not detected either by me, my first officer, or by the captain of another major air carrier in the jump seat! Supplemental information from acn 474039: on this particular day, rainshowers were passing through the seattle area, creating small storm cells, and broken clouds at 3500 ft with 10 mi visibility. Winds were reported 190 degrees at 18 KTS gusting to 27 KTS. LLWS advisory was in effect with 'gains and losses of 15 KTS on final approach.' our flight was 'cleared for a visual approach to runway 16R seatac airport, contact tower over boeing field.' there was a B727 line abreast of us making an approach to runway 16L. We found that the wind readout on the FMC was 230 degrees at 33 KTS magnetic on final -- more crosswind than reported. Gains and losses were at least 15 KTS. I was the PF, and was concerned with configuring the aircraft, flying a stabilized approach, and staying on runway centerline, so as not to drift and create a conflict with the B727 approaching the adjacent runway. The approach, landing and rollout went fine, and I xferred control to the captain after entering a highspd taxiway. At that point I looked down at the radio and noticed that we were still on approach control frequency. We had landed without contacting the tower! I normally confirm our aircraft's confign and that we are 'cleared to land' a couple of time on final. This particular day, I was busy and hadn't confirmed we were 'cleared to land' with tower. After this occurrence, I will mentally re-emphasize the necessity to confirm we are 'cleared to land' and our confign on final approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW LANDED AT SEA WITHOUT LNDG CLRNC.

Narrative: FLT WAS INBOUND TO SEA AND IN CTL OF SEA APCH CTL. SPRING WX IN AREA INCLUDED RAIN SHOWERS AND HIGH WINDS, RESULTING IN 25-30 KT XWINDS AND GAINS/LOSSES OF 15 KTS AIRSPD RPTED BY PREVIOUS ACFT, AS WELL AS ON THE ATIS RPT. JUST AS WE WERE MAKING THE BASE-TO-FINAL TURN, APCH HANDED US OFF TO SEA TWR AND IN THE SAME XMISSION SAID TO 'MAINTAIN 170 KTS TO BOEING' MEANING BOEING FIELD ARPT ABOUT 2 MI AHEAD. THIS WAS A VERY BUSY MOMENT, AS A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF WIND DRIFT WAS BLOWING US ONTO THE FINAL APCH COURSE (PATH). I WAS FOCUSING MY ATTN ON THIS TO ENSURE THE FO WAS GOING TO ROLL OUT ON THE EXTENDED CTRLINE OF RWY 16R, AS ANOTHER ACFT TO OUR L WAS APCHING RWY 16L FROM THE N. MEANWHILE, THE FO WAS TRYING TO SLOW TO THE 170 KTS ADVISED BY THE CTLR, AND BEGAN CALLING FOR FLAP EXTENSIONS AND SETTING SPDS IN THE SPD WINDOW ON THE MCP. IT WAS A LITTLE TURBULENT, AND THE AIRSPD BEGAN THE FLUCTUATIONS OF +/-15 KTS AS ADVERTISED BY ATIS, ETC. WE FINISHED CONFIGURING AND CONTINUED TO THE RWY AND LANDED. IT WAS WHEN WE TURNED OFF ON THE HIGH SPD TURNOFF BTWN RWY 16R&L THAT THE FO GAVE THE ACFT BACK TO ME TO TAXI TO THE GATE. HE LOOKED DOWN TO THE RADIO PANEL AND SAID 'I DON'T THINK WE EVER MADE IT TO TWR.' I HAD THAT SINKING FEELING OF REALIZATION IN MY STOMACH WHEN I REALIZED HE WAS RIGHT! HE CONTACTED GND AND THAT CTLR SAID 'GO BACK TO TWR AND HOLD SHORT OF THE L FOR DEPARTING TFC.' (NO TONE OF ALARM IN HIS VOICE, WHATSOEVER!) TWR WAS CALLED, AND THE TWR CTLR SAID 'CONTINUE HOLDING SHORT.' HE THEN CROSSED US OVER RWY 16L AND WE CONTACTED GND PER HIS INSTRUCTIONS. GND MERELY CLRED US TO OUR GATE WITH NO APPARENT CONCERN OVER THE EVENT, AS FAR AS WE COULD TELL. CLRLY, I MUST DEVELOP A NEW TECHNIQUE TO ENSURE A LNDG CLRNC HAS BEEN OBTAINED, THAT IS IMMUNE TO DISTRS. THE ONE I HAD BEEN USING FOR YRS (NOT TURNING ON THE OUTBOARD LNDG LIGHTS UNTIL CLRED TO LAND) LET ME DOWN TODAY. PERHAPS A MENTAL CHK, AT SAY 1000 FT AGL, WOULD BE BETTER. NOTE: THE ABSENCE OF A LNDG CLRNC WAS NOT DETECTED EITHER BY ME, MY FO, OR BY THE CAPT OF ANOTHER MAJOR ACR IN THE JUMP SEAT! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 474039: ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY, RAINSHOWERS WERE PASSING THROUGH THE SEATTLE AREA, CREATING SMALL STORM CELLS, AND BROKEN CLOUDS AT 3500 FT WITH 10 MI VISIBILITY. WINDS WERE RPTED 190 DEGS AT 18 KTS GUSTING TO 27 KTS. LLWS ADVISORY WAS IN EFFECT WITH 'GAINS AND LOSSES OF 15 KTS ON FINAL APCH.' OUR FLT WAS 'CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16R SEATAC ARPT, CONTACT TWR OVER BOEING FIELD.' THERE WAS A B727 LINE ABREAST OF US MAKING AN APCH TO RWY 16L. WE FOUND THAT THE WIND READOUT ON THE FMC WAS 230 DEGS AT 33 KTS MAGNETIC ON FINAL -- MORE XWIND THAN RPTED. GAINS AND LOSSES WERE AT LEAST 15 KTS. I WAS THE PF, AND WAS CONCERNED WITH CONFIGURING THE ACFT, FLYING A STABILIZED APCH, AND STAYING ON RWY CTRLINE, SO AS NOT TO DRIFT AND CREATE A CONFLICT WITH THE B727 APCHING THE ADJACENT RWY. THE APCH, LNDG AND ROLLOUT WENT FINE, AND I XFERRED CTL TO THE CAPT AFTER ENTERING A HIGHSPD TXWY. AT THAT POINT I LOOKED DOWN AT THE RADIO AND NOTICED THAT WE WERE STILL ON APCH CTL FREQ. WE HAD LANDED WITHOUT CONTACTING THE TWR! I NORMALLY CONFIRM OUR ACFT'S CONFIGN AND THAT WE ARE 'CLRED TO LAND' A COUPLE OF TIME ON FINAL. THIS PARTICULAR DAY, I WAS BUSY AND HADN'T CONFIRMED WE WERE 'CLRED TO LAND' WITH TWR. AFTER THIS OCCURRENCE, I WILL MENTALLY RE-EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO CONFIRM WE ARE 'CLRED TO LAND' AND OUR CONFIGN ON FINAL APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.