Narrative:

Runway 31L&right were in use. The runway 31L displaced threshold was closed, as it has been for months, due to a pavement failure during the winter months. Men and equipment were working on it earlier in the day, making repairs. Runway 31L departures are utilizing intersection K and ka near the displaced threshold for departure. Because this runway closure was on the displaced threshold, the landing length of the runway was unchanged. A B747 was assigned a visual approach to runway 31L. He called inbound. I issued the wind (approximately 200 degrees at 4 KTS), a slight tailwind, and I cleared the aircraft to land on runway 31L. As I was accommodating a VFR helicopter departure, I heard the amass alert sound. I quickly assessed the situation, scanning the runway and locating the helicopter. I observed the B747 land on the displaced threshold. I feel that the alarm sounded too late and there was not enough time for the aircraft to execute a missed approach. When the alarm sounded, the aircraft was well over the runway pavement, 'a lander,' and flared for touchdown. Thus, I did not order the aircraft to go around. The aircraft landed beyond the airport manager who was in a vehicle operating on the closed portion, in the process of reopening a portion of the runway. After the incident, I was advised that the amass runway confign was incorrectly set. Having never heard of this before, I was advised that equipment wads set on '3131,' which is for operations utilizing the full length. Apparently, there was a setting called 'DP31' that should have been used. I spoke to a few controllers and most had had no idea what 'DP31' means. This setting should have been monitored by the supervisor. Additionally, we asked the airways facilities radar technician about the amass settings and he was not sure of what the differences were. I do not know if the alarm would have sounded earlier and a go around could have been issued and obeyed or if the alarm would have been suppressed and no warning heard on this alternative amass setting. The airways facilities radar technician was unsure. Additionally, I was advised that the new york approach controller did not verify that the pilot had the current ATIS, which contained the runway closure information. Since I started working at jfk airport, the airport operator (the port authority/authorized of new york and new jersey), has routinely closed portions of the active runway and the tower has continued to operate aircraft over the closed portions. Additionally, with this partial runway closure, visual approachs (non precision approachs) have been authority/authorized routinely. This operation is extremely dangerous! I do not feel that any part of an active runway should be closed with men and equipment working on them. Close the entire runway! And if that is not possible, I believe that there should be a ruling which mandates a precision approach for these circumstances, in the very least. It is my understanding that the reason for a displaced threshold is to ensure obstacle clearance. Then why would it be appropriate to put men and equipment on an active runway displaced threshold and not protect for them? They are now a new obstruction to landing aircraft. I find these practices disturbing and have seen firsthand what can happen if the pilot does not land their aircraft perfectly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 LANDS ON CLOSED PORTION OF RWY AT JFK.

Narrative: RWY 31L&R WERE IN USE. THE RWY 31L DISPLACED THRESHOLD WAS CLOSED, AS IT HAS BEEN FOR MONTHS, DUE TO A PAVEMENT FAILURE DURING THE WINTER MONTHS. MEN AND EQUIP WERE WORKING ON IT EARLIER IN THE DAY, MAKING REPAIRS. RWY 31L DEPS ARE UTILIZING INTXN K AND KA NEAR THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD FOR DEP. BECAUSE THIS RWY CLOSURE WAS ON THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD, THE LNDG LENGTH OF THE RWY WAS UNCHANGED. A B747 WAS ASSIGNED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 31L. HE CALLED INBOUND. I ISSUED THE WIND (APPROX 200 DEGS AT 4 KTS), A SLIGHT TAILWIND, AND I CLRED THE ACFT TO LAND ON RWY 31L. AS I WAS ACCOMMODATING A VFR HELI DEP, I HEARD THE AMASS ALERT SOUND. I QUICKLY ASSESSED THE SIT, SCANNING THE RWY AND LOCATING THE HELI. I OBSERVED THE B747 LAND ON THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD. I FEEL THAT THE ALARM SOUNDED TOO LATE AND THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME FOR THE ACFT TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. WHEN THE ALARM SOUNDED, THE ACFT WAS WELL OVER THE RWY PAVEMENT, 'A LANDER,' AND FLARED FOR TOUCHDOWN. THUS, I DID NOT ORDER THE ACFT TO GO AROUND. THE ACFT LANDED BEYOND THE ARPT MGR WHO WAS IN A VEHICLE OPERATING ON THE CLOSED PORTION, IN THE PROCESS OF REOPENING A PORTION OF THE RWY. AFTER THE INCIDENT, I WAS ADVISED THAT THE AMASS RWY CONFIGN WAS INCORRECTLY SET. HAVING NEVER HEARD OF THIS BEFORE, I WAS ADVISED THAT EQUIP WADS SET ON '3131,' WHICH IS FOR OPS UTILIZING THE FULL LENGTH. APPARENTLY, THERE WAS A SETTING CALLED 'DP31' THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED. I SPOKE TO A FEW CTLRS AND MOST HAD HAD NO IDEA WHAT 'DP31' MEANS. THIS SETTING SHOULD HAVE BEEN MONITORED BY THE SUPVR. ADDITIONALLY, WE ASKED THE AIRWAYS FACILITIES RADAR TECHNICIAN ABOUT THE AMASS SETTINGS AND HE WAS NOT SURE OF WHAT THE DIFFERENCES WERE. I DO NOT KNOW IF THE ALARM WOULD HAVE SOUNDED EARLIER AND A GAR COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED AND OBEYED OR IF THE ALARM WOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED AND NO WARNING HEARD ON THIS ALTERNATIVE AMASS SETTING. THE AIRWAYS FACILITIES RADAR TECHNICIAN WAS UNSURE. ADDITIONALLY, I WAS ADVISED THAT THE NEW YORK APCH CTLR DID NOT VERIFY THAT THE PLT HAD THE CURRENT ATIS, WHICH CONTAINED THE RWY CLOSURE INFO. SINCE I STARTED WORKING AT JFK ARPT, THE ARPT OPERATOR (THE PORT AUTH OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY), HAS ROUTINELY CLOSED PORTIONS OF THE ACTIVE RWY AND THE TWR HAS CONTINUED TO OPERATE ACFT OVER THE CLOSED PORTIONS. ADDITIONALLY, WITH THIS PARTIAL RWY CLOSURE, VISUAL APCHS (NON PRECISION APCHS) HAVE BEEN AUTH ROUTINELY. THIS OP IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS! I DO NOT FEEL THAT ANY PART OF AN ACTIVE RWY SHOULD BE CLOSED WITH MEN AND EQUIP WORKING ON THEM. CLOSE THE ENTIRE RWY! AND IF THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE, I BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A RULING WHICH MANDATES A PRECISION APCH FOR THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IN THE VERY LEAST. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE REASON FOR A DISPLACED THRESHOLD IS TO ENSURE OBSTACLE CLRNC. THEN WHY WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE TO PUT MEN AND EQUIP ON AN ACTIVE RWY DISPLACED THRESHOLD AND NOT PROTECT FOR THEM? THEY ARE NOW A NEW OBSTRUCTION TO LNDG ACFT. I FIND THESE PRACTICES DISTURBING AND HAVE SEEN FIRSTHAND WHAT CAN HAPPEN IF THE PLT DOES NOT LAND THEIR ACFT PERFECTLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.