Narrative:

A DC9 aircraft arrived at my gate in ZZZ at the beginning of my workday (2ND shift) with approximately a 1 hour ground time. I did a visual walkaround inspection, then entered the cockpit to check the gauges for oil levels and to look at the logbooks. Both engines were low on oil, and the left engine was actually written up. I asked a crew mate, 2 gates over, to service one of the engines with me. I pulled the tug with oil bowser up to engine #1, and my partner svced it. I assisted him while he completed the service and closed it up. I moved the tug to engine #2 as he walked over and waited. He then reset the quantity indicator, turned on the electric pump, and handed me the service hose. At the same time, I opened the service door, removed the oil cap, wiped it clean, and inspected the o-ring for damage. I then began adding oil to the tank. During this whole time, it started to rain, which was a distraction, as we didn't have any rain gear on. The partner, I asked to help, (a mandate when double oil servicing a DC9) was the newest member added to our crew, and I hadn't worked with him before. Also, the flight was due to depart shortly, and logbook entries still needed to be made. As we wrapped up and stowed the service hose, we agreed to meet in the cockpit. He walked and I jumped on the tug and drove it around to the jetway stairs, neglecting to secure the oil cap. In-flight, the captain noticed a considerable oil loss and called it in to maintenance control, but did not have an in-flight shutdown. There's no excuse for neglecting to complete a task, but there are contributing human factors. Foremost is that I got out of my routine. Normally on a double oil service, 1 guy completely services 1 engine and I service my engine by myself, from the first step to the last step, by my habitual routine, thinking about each next step. I think outside influences, like time, WX, and others can't be allowed to affect the thorough completion of safety related tasks.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC9-50 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE R ENG OIL FILLER CAP NOT SECURED. INCURRED MAJOR LOSS OF ENG OIL. ENG NOT SHUT DOWN.

Narrative: A DC9 ACFT ARRIVED AT MY GATE IN ZZZ AT THE BEGINNING OF MY WORKDAY (2ND SHIFT) WITH APPROX A 1 HR GND TIME. I DID A VISUAL WALKAROUND INSPECTION, THEN ENTERED THE COCKPIT TO CHK THE GAUGES FOR OIL LEVELS AND TO LOOK AT THE LOGBOOKS. BOTH ENGS WERE LOW ON OIL, AND THE L ENG WAS ACTUALLY WRITTEN UP. I ASKED A CREW MATE, 2 GATES OVER, TO SVC ONE OF THE ENGS WITH ME. I PULLED THE TUG WITH OIL BOWSER UP TO ENG #1, AND MY PARTNER SVCED IT. I ASSISTED HIM WHILE HE COMPLETED THE SVC AND CLOSED IT UP. I MOVED THE TUG TO ENG #2 AS HE WALKED OVER AND WAITED. HE THEN RESET THE QUANTITY INDICATOR, TURNED ON THE ELECTRIC PUMP, AND HANDED ME THE SVC HOSE. AT THE SAME TIME, I OPENED THE SVC DOOR, REMOVED THE OIL CAP, WIPED IT CLEAN, AND INSPECTED THE O-RING FOR DAMAGE. I THEN BEGAN ADDING OIL TO THE TANK. DURING THIS WHOLE TIME, IT STARTED TO RAIN, WHICH WAS A DISTR, AS WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY RAIN GEAR ON. THE PARTNER, I ASKED TO HELP, (A MANDATE WHEN DOUBLE OIL SVCING A DC9) WAS THE NEWEST MEMBER ADDED TO OUR CREW, AND I HADN'T WORKED WITH HIM BEFORE. ALSO, THE FLT WAS DUE TO DEPART SHORTLY, AND LOGBOOK ENTRIES STILL NEEDED TO BE MADE. AS WE WRAPPED UP AND STOWED THE SVC HOSE, WE AGREED TO MEET IN THE COCKPIT. HE WALKED AND I JUMPED ON THE TUG AND DROVE IT AROUND TO THE JETWAY STAIRS, NEGLECTING TO SECURE THE OIL CAP. INFLT, THE CAPT NOTICED A CONSIDERABLE OIL LOSS AND CALLED IT IN TO MAINT CTL, BUT DID NOT HAVE AN INFLT SHUTDOWN. THERE'S NO EXCUSE FOR NEGLECTING TO COMPLETE A TASK, BUT THERE ARE CONTRIBUTING HUMAN FACTORS. FOREMOST IS THAT I GOT OUT OF MY ROUTINE. NORMALLY ON A DOUBLE OIL SVC, 1 GUY COMPLETELY SVCS 1 ENG AND I SVC MY ENG BY MYSELF, FROM THE FIRST STEP TO THE LAST STEP, BY MY HABITUAL ROUTINE, THINKING ABOUT EACH NEXT STEP. I THINK OUTSIDE INFLUENCES, LIKE TIME, WX, AND OTHERS CAN'T BE ALLOWED TO AFFECT THE THOROUGH COMPLETION OF SAFETY RELATED TASKS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.