Narrative:

Departing runway 25 at den the tower directed us to abort. Airspeed was 120 KTS, OAT 27 degrees C, winds were light. Captain (I) saw flying and immediately initiated the abort. I saw nothing on the runway ahead however I was uncertain what the tower was. My thought was that something big departed the airplane which would render us unable to fly. We had plenty of runway ahead and were below V1. The airplane was fully functional and the reject was uneventful. We exited the first and only high speed taxiway. After taxiing clear of the runway I had the first officer get into the flight manual to see how we looked for cool down time. Denver tower advised us that their ground based radar was showing vehicles on the runway. We asked maintenance to meet us to install the chocks per directives in the limits section. We taxied to the deicing pad so to be clear of the other aircraft. We contacted maintenance controller to verify our cool down time. We both came up with over 90 mins. Local maintenance advised that the fuse plugs were blown on tires #1 and #3. They changed tire #1 and deemed the aircraft capable to taxi to gate. While waiting for the tire change I contacted the tower and spoke to the supervisor. He advised me that the surface radar system showed 3 alerts. After our abort it showed many more, I believe he said hundreds. He apologized for the computer and said they have turned it off. I then contacted the air carrier manager and brought him up to date. With maintenance approval we taxied slowly to the gate and changed airplanes. Items of note (looking at possible improvements). 1) we have not talked about high speed rejects that were called by the tower. Fortunately we were below V1. I will be reviewing it in my mind for the next few days. 2) there were way too many frequency changes between maintenance, ramp, load planning, gate controller, etc. 3) people were not sure of their job description. Maintenance felt it was ramp service that should block in an airplane with hot brakes. It took over 15 mins to provide us with chocks. By that time the fuses were blown. All involved were doing their best, but they were confused about what agency should be handling us. Perhaps we could look at discreet frequency for a supervisor to coordinate for an aircraft in possible distress. In addition to the first officer going back and forth between agencies, I was on my cell phone to maintenance controller and dispatch. 4) we asked for a csr supervisor who arrived after the airplane was empty. All involved were doing their best, but they were confused about what agency should be handling us. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the captain talked to the tower supervisor. He said asde was tracking 3 false targets that resulted in the false amass warning. The tower controller did not know how fast the aircraft was going. After the event, asde literally had hundreds of false targets. The reporter indicated he was about 10 KTS below V1 when the abort occurred. When the captain did not see any conflicting traffic on the runway, he thought the controller saw something that made the aircraft unairworthy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW WAS DIRECTED TO ABORT THEIR TKOF BY THE ATCT LCL CTLR AT DEN, BECAUSE OF AN ATC 'ARPT MOVEMENT AREA SAFETY SYS' AMASS WARNING. THE WARNING WAS FALSE. THE ACFT TIRES AND BRAKES WERE EXTENSIVELY DAMAGED IN THE HIGH SPD ABORT.

Narrative: DEPARTING RWY 25 AT DEN THE TWR DIRECTED US TO ABORT. AIRSPD WAS 120 KTS, OAT 27 DEGS C, WINDS WERE LIGHT. CAPT (I) SAW FLYING AND IMMEDIATELY INITIATED THE ABORT. I SAW NOTHING ON THE RWY AHEAD HOWEVER I WAS UNCERTAIN WHAT THE TWR WAS. MY THOUGHT WAS THAT SOMETHING BIG DEPARTED THE AIRPLANE WHICH WOULD RENDER US UNABLE TO FLY. WE HAD PLENTY OF RWY AHEAD AND WERE BELOW V1. THE AIRPLANE WAS FULLY FUNCTIONAL AND THE REJECT WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE EXITED THE FIRST AND ONLY HIGH SPD TXWY. AFTER TAXIING CLR OF THE RWY I HAD THE FO GET INTO THE FLT MANUAL TO SEE HOW WE LOOKED FOR COOL DOWN TIME. DENVER TWR ADVISED US THAT THEIR GND BASED RADAR WAS SHOWING VEHICLES ON THE RWY. WE ASKED MAINT TO MEET US TO INSTALL THE CHOCKS PER DIRECTIVES IN THE LIMITS SECTION. WE TAXIED TO THE DEICING PAD SO TO BE CLR OF THE OTHER ACFT. WE CONTACTED MAINT CTLR TO VERIFY OUR COOL DOWN TIME. WE BOTH CAME UP WITH OVER 90 MINS. LCL MAINT ADVISED THAT THE FUSE PLUGS WERE BLOWN ON TIRES #1 AND #3. THEY CHANGED TIRE #1 AND DEEMED THE ACFT CAPABLE TO TAXI TO GATE. WHILE WAITING FOR THE TIRE CHANGE I CONTACTED THE TWR AND SPOKE TO THE SUPVR. HE ADVISED ME THAT THE SURFACE RADAR SYS SHOWED 3 ALERTS. AFTER OUR ABORT IT SHOWED MANY MORE, I BELIEVE HE SAID HUNDREDS. HE APOLOGIZED FOR THE COMPUTER AND SAID THEY HAVE TURNED IT OFF. I THEN CONTACTED THE ACR MGR AND BROUGHT HIM UP TO DATE. WITH MAINT APPROVAL WE TAXIED SLOWLY TO THE GATE AND CHANGED AIRPLANES. ITEMS OF NOTE (LOOKING AT POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS). 1) WE HAVE NOT TALKED ABOUT HIGH SPD REJECTS THAT WERE CALLED BY THE TWR. FORTUNATELY WE WERE BELOW V1. I WILL BE REVIEWING IT IN MY MIND FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS. 2) THERE WERE WAY TOO MANY FREQ CHANGES BTWN MAINT, RAMP, LOAD PLANNING, GATE CTLR, ETC. 3) PEOPLE WERE NOT SURE OF THEIR JOB DESCRIPTION. MAINT FELT IT WAS RAMP SVC THAT SHOULD BLOCK IN AN AIRPLANE WITH HOT BRAKES. IT TOOK OVER 15 MINS TO PROVIDE US WITH CHOCKS. BY THAT TIME THE FUSES WERE BLOWN. ALL INVOLVED WERE DOING THEIR BEST, BUT THEY WERE CONFUSED ABOUT WHAT AGENCY SHOULD BE HANDLING US. PERHAPS WE COULD LOOK AT DISCREET FREQ FOR A SUPVR TO COORDINATE FOR AN ACFT IN POSSIBLE DISTRESS. IN ADDITION TO THE FO GOING BACK AND FORTH BTWN AGENCIES, I WAS ON MY CELL PHONE TO MAINT CTLR AND DISPATCH. 4) WE ASKED FOR A CSR SUPVR WHO ARRIVED AFTER THE AIRPLANE WAS EMPTY. ALL INVOLVED WERE DOING THEIR BEST, BUT THEY WERE CONFUSED ABOUT WHAT AGENCY SHOULD BE HANDLING US. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT TALKED TO THE TWR SUPVR. HE SAID ASDE WAS TRACKING 3 FALSE TARGETS THAT RESULTED IN THE FALSE AMASS WARNING. THE TWR CTLR DID NOT KNOW HOW FAST THE ACFT WAS GOING. AFTER THE EVENT, ASDE LITERALLY HAD HUNDREDS OF FALSE TARGETS. THE RPTR INDICATED HE WAS ABOUT 10 KTS BELOW V1 WHEN THE ABORT OCCURRED. WHEN THE CAPT DID NOT SEE ANY CONFLICTING TFC ON THE RWY, HE THOUGHT THE CTLR SAW SOMETHING THAT MADE THE ACFT UNAIRWORTHY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.