Narrative:

On dec/tue/2004 at approximately xa:30, aircraft X incurred damage to the #2 engine inboard thrust reverser cowl. This damage was caused by leading edge flap extension with the reverser cowl full open for access to fire loops work in progress. A write up was made stating the #2 engine inboard thrust reverser cowl damaged. On sun/dec/2004 I returned to work after regular days off and reviewed maintenance history for aircraft X to find write up had been signed off as 'made in error' and a new write up found delam on walkaround on #2 inboard reverser cowl. Shop mechanic repaired per shop specification. I had discussed with maintenance supervisor at time of damage to reverser cowl the need for write ups for right leading edge flap inspection for damage as well as right reverser half fit and right engine thrust reverser operations check. To date no write ups have been made. I have more information regarding this accident as to cause and prevention, and the facts show clearly the falsification of aircraft records and conspiracy to cover up aircraft X's damage. It is my concern for my passenger and crew that without leading edge flap and reverser inspection and repair that aircraft may not be airworthy. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter was troubleshooting a right engine fire warning loop and had the inboard thrust reverser fan cowling locked open. The reporter was working underneath the cowling when the electric hydraulic pumps were activated with no required warning and immediately extended the leading edge devices. The person activating the hydraulic pumps was recently assigned to work as a line technician after working many years in a shop. This technician was untrained and not aware of the safety procedures when working on a line airplane. No verbal warning given to technicians working other jobs in and around the airplane. The inboard leading edge flap extended damaging the opened cowling and possibly the flap. The reporter entered a non routine card for inspection and repair of the right engine left inboard fan cowling and the right inboard leading edge flap. The cowling was of composite honeycomb construction and was obviously damaged but the flap needed inspection to determine extent of damage if any. The reporter went on his regular days off and on returning discovered the write up for the cowling inspection and inboard leading edge flap inspection and repair was cleared as 'entered in error' and the incident was not entered in the aircraft maintenance history. The cowling was repaired prior to being returned to service but no record exists on the right wing inboard leading edge flap disposition. This is a flight control item and the reporter stated that he has a moral concern that safety of flight may be compromised.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 #2 ENG THRUST REVERSER COWLING WAS DAMAGED WHEN THE LEADING EDGE DEVICES WERE INADVERTENTLY DEPLOYED. RPTR STATED NON ROUTINE CARD TO COVER REPAIR AND INSPECTION OF COWLING AND LEADING EDGE FLAP NOT ENTERED IN ACFT HISTORY.

Narrative: ON DEC/TUE/2004 AT APPROX XA:30, ACFT X INCURRED DAMAGE TO THE #2 ENG INBOARD THRUST REVERSER COWL. THIS DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY LEADING EDGE FLAP EXTENSION WITH THE REVERSER COWL FULL OPEN FOR ACCESS TO FIRE LOOPS WORK IN PROGRESS. A WRITE UP WAS MADE STATING THE #2 ENG INBOARD THRUST REVERSER COWL DAMAGED. ON SUN/DEC/2004 I RETURNED TO WORK AFTER REGULAR DAYS OFF AND REVIEWED MAINT HISTORY FOR ACFT X TO FIND WRITE UP HAD BEEN SIGNED OFF AS 'MADE IN ERROR' AND A NEW WRITE UP FOUND DELAM ON WALKAROUND ON #2 INBOARD REVERSER COWL. SHOP MECHANIC REPAIRED PER SHOP SPEC. I HAD DISCUSSED WITH MAINT SUPERVISOR AT TIME OF DAMAGE TO REVERSER COWL THE NEED FOR WRITE UPS FOR R LEADING EDGE FLAP INSPECTION FOR DAMAGE AS WELL AS R REVERSER HALF FIT AND R ENG THRUST REVERSER OPS CHECK. TO DATE NO WRITE UPS HAVE BEEN MADE. I HAVE MORE INFO REGARDING THIS ACCIDENT AS TO CAUSE AND PREVENTION, AND THE FACTS SHOW CLEARLY THE FALSIFICATION OF ACFT RECORDS AND CONSPIRACY TO COVER UP ACFT X'S DAMAGE. IT IS MY CONCERN FOR MY PAX AND CREW THAT WITHOUT LEADING EDGE FLAP AND REVERSER INSPECTION AND REPAIR THAT ACFT MAY NOT BE AIRWORTHY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS TROUBLESHOOTING A R ENG FIRE WARNING LOOP AND HAD THE INBOARD THRUST REVERSER FAN COWLING LOCKED OPEN. THE RPTR WAS WORKING UNDERNEATH THE COWLING WHEN THE ELECTRIC HYDRAULIC PUMPS WERE ACTIVATED WITH NO REQUIRED WARNING AND IMMEDIATELY EXTENDED THE LEADING EDGE DEVICES. THE PERSON ACTIVATING THE HYDRAULIC PUMPS WAS RECENTLY ASSIGNED TO WORK AS A LINE TECHNICIAN AFTER WORKING MANY YEARS IN A SHOP. THIS TECHNICIAN WAS UNTRAINED AND NOT AWARE OF THE SAFETY PROCS WHEN WORKING ON A LINE AIRPLANE. NO VERBAL WARNING GIVEN TO TECHNICIANS WORKING OTHER JOBS IN AND AROUND THE AIRPLANE. THE INBOARD LEADING EDGE FLAP EXTENDED DAMAGING THE OPENED COWLING AND POSSIBLY THE FLAP. THE RPTR ENTERED A NON ROUTINE CARD FOR INSPECTION AND REPAIR OF THE R ENG L INBOARD FAN COWLING AND THE R INBOARD LEADING EDGE FLAP. THE COWLING WAS OF COMPOSITE HONEYCOMB CONSTRUCTION AND WAS OBVIOUSLY DAMAGED BUT THE FLAP NEEDED INSPECTION TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF DAMAGE IF ANY. THE RPTR WENT ON HIS REGULAR DAYS OFF AND ON RETURNING DISCOVERED THE WRITE UP FOR THE COWLING INSPECTION AND INBOARD LEADING EDGE FLAP INSPECTION AND REPAIR WAS CLEARED AS 'ENTERED IN ERROR' AND THE INCIDENT WAS NOT ENTERED IN THE ACFT MAINT HISTORY. THE COWLING WAS REPAIRED PRIOR TO BEING RETURNED TO SERVICE BUT NO RECORD EXISTS ON THE R WING INBOARD LEADING EDGE FLAP DISPOSITION. THIS IS A FLT CTL ITEM AND THE RPTR STATED THAT HE HAS A MORAL CONCERN THAT SAFETY OF FLT MAY BE COMPROMISED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.