Narrative:

We were cleared the teb 5 SID using runway 24. Climb on runway heading until reaching 1500 ft then turn right to 280 degree heading. Maintain 1500 ft until 4.5 DME (teb) then climb and maintain 2000 ft. On this flight the co-pilot was the flying pilot. Prior to departure we reviewed the SID together. I thought he was completely aware of the altitude restrs. After deping (teb) he did not stop the climb at 1500 ft but at 1700 ft; I told him he needed to descend to 1500 ft until 4.5 DME then climb to 2000 ft. As soon as he approached 1500 ft he then started his climb to 2000 ft. At that point we were at approximately at 3 DME from (teb). When we contacted ny departure they told us that we need to maintain the 1500 ft until 4.5 DME and not any sooner. While en route from teb to fxe I reviewed with the co-pilot the SID and explained the importance on compliance with all clrncs; and to always communicate with the other crewmember. During the departure; there was never any conflict or evasive action required. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter; the captain and PNF on this flight; believed that they had properly briefed the departure and that the sic had confirmed he understood the restrs. Yet; even after an intervention by the captain to return to 1500 ft the climb was again initiated prior to the 4.5 mi arc. He advised their aircraft; although FMS equipped; does not employ automatic throttles and thus the flying pilot must initiate all thrust changes. He stated that; although the co-pilot was hand flying; the flight director was engaged and was commanding a level off which apparently was not observed or acted upon. He felt that the co-pilot was well behind the airplane and unable to catch up. In addition; the departure itself is not line selectable and; therefore; the autoplt assistance available from a totally programmed display is not available to the flight crew. The reporter suggested the departure chart would be more user friendly if it were to be uncluttered. He suggested it be divided into multiple 'alpha and bravo; etc.' pages depicting departures for only a single runway. Lastly; the reporter and the analyst discussed the common practice of allowing sic pilots to utilize the left seat during 'their' legs. There is merit to the possibility that such seat switching; which requires reversed use of hands to manage throttle and flight parch control from that of the 'routine and usual' seat; may add to the difficulty of efficiently and accurately performing the complex and/or rapidly changing flight dynamics often associated with departure procedures in high density airspace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF CL604 FAIL TO LEVEL AT 1500 PER TEB DEP PROC.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED THE TEB 5 SID USING RWY 24. CLB ON RWY HDG UNTIL REACHING 1500 FT THEN TURN R TO 280 DEG HDG. MAINTAIN 1500 FT UNTIL 4.5 DME (TEB) THEN CLB AND MAINTAIN 2000 FT. ON THIS FLT THE CO-PLT WAS THE FLYING PLT. PRIOR TO DEP WE REVIEWED THE SID TOGETHER. I THOUGHT HE WAS COMPLETELY AWARE OF THE ALT RESTRS. AFTER DEPING (TEB) HE DID NOT STOP THE CLB AT 1500 FT BUT AT 1700 FT; I TOLD HIM HE NEEDED TO DSND TO 1500 FT UNTIL 4.5 DME THEN CLB TO 2000 FT. AS SOON AS HE APCHED 1500 FT HE THEN STARTED HIS CLB TO 2000 FT. AT THAT POINT WE WERE AT APPROX AT 3 DME FROM (TEB). WHEN WE CONTACTED NY DEP THEY TOLD US THAT WE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE 1500 FT UNTIL 4.5 DME AND NOT ANY SOONER. WHILE ENRTE FROM TEB TO FXE I REVIEWED WITH THE CO-PLT THE SID AND EXPLAINED THE IMPORTANCE ON COMPLIANCE WITH ALL CLRNCS; AND TO ALWAYS COMMUNICATE WITH THE OTHER CREWMEMBER. DURING THE DEP; THERE WAS NEVER ANY CONFLICT OR EVASIVE ACTION REQUIRED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR; THE CAPT AND PNF ON THIS FLT; BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD PROPERLY BRIEFED THE DEP AND THAT THE SIC HAD CONFIRMED HE UNDERSTOOD THE RESTRS. YET; EVEN AFTER AN INTERVENTION BY THE CAPT TO RETURN TO 1500 FT THE CLB WAS AGAIN INITIATED PRIOR TO THE 4.5 MI ARC. HE ADVISED THEIR ACFT; ALTHOUGH FMS EQUIPPED; DOES NOT EMPLOY AUTO THROTTLES AND THUS THE FLYING PLT MUST INITIATE ALL THRUST CHANGES. HE STATED THAT; ALTHOUGH THE CO-PLT WAS HAND FLYING; THE FLT DIRECTOR WAS ENGAGED AND WAS COMMANDING A LEVEL OFF WHICH APPARENTLY WAS NOT OBSERVED OR ACTED UPON. HE FELT THAT THE CO-PLT WAS WELL BEHIND THE AIRPLANE AND UNABLE TO CATCH UP. IN ADDITION; THE DEP ITSELF IS NOT LINE SELECTABLE AND; THEREFORE; THE AUTOPLT ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FROM A TOTALLY PROGRAMMED DISPLAY IS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE FLT CREW. THE RPTR SUGGESTED THE DEP CHART WOULD BE MORE USER FRIENDLY IF IT WERE TO BE UNCLUTTERED. HE SUGGESTED IT BE DIVIDED INTO MULTIPLE 'ALPHA AND BRAVO; ETC.' PAGES DEPICTING DEPS FOR ONLY A SINGLE RWY. LASTLY; THE RPTR AND THE ANALYST DISCUSSED THE COMMON PRACTICE OF ALLOWING SIC PLTS TO UTILIZE THE L SEAT DURING 'THEIR' LEGS. THERE IS MERIT TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH SEAT SWITCHING; WHICH REQUIRES REVERSED USE OF HANDS TO MANAGE THROTTLE AND FLT PARCH CTL FROM THAT OF THE 'ROUTINE AND USUAL' SEAT; MAY ADD TO THE DIFFICULTY OF EFFICIENTLY AND ACCURATELY PERFORMING THE COMPLEX AND/OR RAPIDLY CHANGING FLT DYNAMICS OFTEN ASSOCIATED WITH DEP PROCS IN HIGH DENSITY AIRSPACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.