Narrative:

We were cleared for approach outside vydda intersection. I started configuring to slow from 210 KTS to 170 KTS at flaps 1 degree. I extended speed brakes as we were getting high on profile and we had to slow down and descend. 2 mi outside vydda; socal asked us to maintain 210 KTS to vydda. Autoplt was on and I selected 210 KTS. Thrust came up as aircraft was in altitude for 4000 ft. I selected 170 KTS again; disconnected autothrust and autoplt; and asked for the swatt crossing altitude of 3600 ft as we were crossing vydda. I called for gear down; final descent checklist. The controller then called and told us to maintain 170 KTS to reebo. I told first officer that we could do that to 2 mi outside reebo and first officer responded. Controller said that he would slow following traffic accordingly. While all of this was going on; the speed brakes were still out and; upon autoplt disconnect; had extended to full. I was hand flying with the throttles at idle. I looked up to see us crossing swatt at 3300 ft MSL; 300 ft below the authority/authorized crossing altitude. I had the first officer select reebo altitude of 2000 ft; reconnected autoplt and autothrust and configured to be on approach speed/profile for cdap approach at reebo. The end result is that I busted the swatt altitude by 300 ft. The final approach segment and landing were stabilized and normal. We did not get a terrain warning or a call from ATC about the swatt crossing being low. Conclusions and contributing factors: even though the WX at san was VFR (few at 800 ft; 6 SM in broken) the beginning of the localizer 27 approach was necessary to pick up the field visually (just outside of reebo). The controller cleared us for the approach and wanted us to hurry by giving us 2 subsequent speed assignments after the approach clearance. This approach in IFR conditions requires us to be fully configured and on approach speed at reebo in order to maintain a stabilized approach rate down the 3.6 degree vertical path. It is unrealistic; even in VFR conditions to ask aircraft to do 170 KTS to a 5 mi final. In fact; we were preceded by an air carrier jet who called the field in sight even though that was nearly impossible under the WX conditions at the time. Regardless; I should never have been pressured to speed up to 210 KTS after slowing and should have not complied with that speed assignment. This is what started the chain of events that led to the altitude bust. The first officer was busy as it was and by disconnecting the autoplt; I loaded him up further with FCU duties while he was already accomplishing checklists; talking with ATC; etc. Instead; just disconnecting the autothrust to get the speed back and then reconnecting it would have put us back on profile while protecting us at swatt for the 3600 ft crossing by leaving the autoplt on. Also; I will make it a point in the future to keep my hand on the speed brake lever while they are in use; so that we don't get thrust and drag at the same time. I also will not let controllers fly me into a corner just to push more 'tin.' suggestions: this is a challenging approach under ideal circumstances. This particular night showed a slight tailwind on final. I believe that; unless aircraft are being cleared for the visual; speeds should not be assigned inside the 10 DME point of iubr.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 ON APCH TO SAN CROSSED SWATT 300 FT LOW IN PART BECAUSE OF ATC REQUEST FOR HIGHER THAN NORMAL SPD.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR APCH OUTSIDE VYDDA INTXN. I STARTED CONFIGURING TO SLOW FROM 210 KTS TO 170 KTS AT FLAPS 1 DEG. I EXTENDED SPD BRAKES AS WE WERE GETTING HIGH ON PROFILE AND WE HAD TO SLOW DOWN AND DSND. 2 MI OUTSIDE VYDDA; SOCAL ASKED US TO MAINTAIN 210 KTS TO VYDDA. AUTOPLT WAS ON AND I SELECTED 210 KTS. THRUST CAME UP AS ACFT WAS IN ALT FOR 4000 FT. I SELECTED 170 KTS AGAIN; DISCONNECTED AUTOTHRUST AND AUTOPLT; AND ASKED FOR THE SWATT XING ALT OF 3600 FT AS WE WERE XING VYDDA. I CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN; FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST. THE CTLR THEN CALLED AND TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 170 KTS TO REEBO. I TOLD FO THAT WE COULD DO THAT TO 2 MI OUTSIDE REEBO AND FO RESPONDED. CTLR SAID THAT HE WOULD SLOW FOLLOWING TFC ACCORDINGLY. WHILE ALL OF THIS WAS GOING ON; THE SPD BRAKES WERE STILL OUT AND; UPON AUTOPLT DISCONNECT; HAD EXTENDED TO FULL. I WAS HAND FLYING WITH THE THROTTLES AT IDLE. I LOOKED UP TO SEE US XING SWATT AT 3300 FT MSL; 300 FT BELOW THE AUTH XING ALT. I HAD THE FO SELECT REEBO ALT OF 2000 FT; RECONNECTED AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHRUST AND CONFIGURED TO BE ON APCH SPD/PROFILE FOR CDAP APCH AT REEBO. THE END RESULT IS THAT I BUSTED THE SWATT ALT BY 300 FT. THE FINAL APCH SEGMENT AND LNDG WERE STABILIZED AND NORMAL. WE DID NOT GET A TERRAIN WARNING OR A CALL FROM ATC ABOUT THE SWATT XING BEING LOW. CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: EVEN THOUGH THE WX AT SAN WAS VFR (FEW AT 800 FT; 6 SM IN BROKEN) THE BEGINNING OF THE LOC 27 APCH WAS NECESSARY TO PICK UP THE FIELD VISUALLY (JUST OUTSIDE OF REEBO). THE CTLR CLRED US FOR THE APCH AND WANTED US TO HURRY BY GIVING US 2 SUBSEQUENT SPD ASSIGNMENTS AFTER THE APCH CLRNC. THIS APCH IN IFR CONDITIONS REQUIRES US TO BE FULLY CONFIGURED AND ON APCH SPD AT REEBO IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A STABILIZED APCH RATE DOWN THE 3.6 DEG VERT PATH. IT IS UNREALISTIC; EVEN IN VFR CONDITIONS TO ASK ACFT TO DO 170 KTS TO A 5 MI FINAL. IN FACT; WE WERE PRECEDED BY AN ACR JET WHO CALLED THE FIELD IN SIGHT EVEN THOUGH THAT WAS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE UNDER THE WX CONDITIONS AT THE TIME. REGARDLESS; I SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN PRESSURED TO SPD UP TO 210 KTS AFTER SLOWING AND SHOULD HAVE NOT COMPLIED WITH THAT SPD ASSIGNMENT. THIS IS WHAT STARTED THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE ALT BUST. THE FO WAS BUSY AS IT WAS AND BY DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT; I LOADED HIM UP FURTHER WITH FCU DUTIES WHILE HE WAS ALREADY ACCOMPLISHING CHKLISTS; TALKING WITH ATC; ETC. INSTEAD; JUST DISCONNECTING THE AUTOTHRUST TO GET THE SPD BACK AND THEN RECONNECTING IT WOULD HAVE PUT US BACK ON PROFILE WHILE PROTECTING US AT SWATT FOR THE 3600 FT XING BY LEAVING THE AUTOPLT ON. ALSO; I WILL MAKE IT A POINT IN THE FUTURE TO KEEP MY HAND ON THE SPD BRAKE LEVER WHILE THEY ARE IN USE; SO THAT WE DON'T GET THRUST AND DRAG AT THE SAME TIME. I ALSO WILL NOT LET CTLRS FLY ME INTO A CORNER JUST TO PUSH MORE 'TIN.' SUGGESTIONS: THIS IS A CHALLENGING APCH UNDER IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS PARTICULAR NIGHT SHOWED A SLIGHT TAILWIND ON FINAL. I BELIEVE THAT; UNLESS ACFT ARE BEING CLRED FOR THE VISUAL; SPDS SHOULD NOT BE ASSIGNED INSIDE THE 10 DME POINT OF IUBR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.