Narrative:

ZLA D-33 controller accepted a pointout from ZDV sector 37 on medium large transport X at FL350, 30 mi southeast of bce (reference point) deviation south for WX, then direct bryce canyon. The D33 controller (myself) judged incorrectly that medium large transport X was not traffic for any aircraft under sector 33's control and would not enter 33's airspace. This decision was based on how the previous aircraft had deviated, since the radar was not depicting any WX at all. I felt it was logical to assume that this aircraft would deviate the same way. Consequently I neither alerted the R33 controller to the pointout, nor did I start a track. 4 mins after accepting the pointout I was assigned to another sector, just prior to the occurrence. Seconds before the occurrence ZDV sector 37 called the R33 controller, who was now 'one holed,' and wanted to know if he was turning widebody transport Y (a las departure flashing handoff to ZDV, climbing to FL370 going direct pawnee city), who was out of FL352 for FL370, and in direct conflict with medium large transport X. At this time the R33 controller noticed the limited data block and issued a 30 degree turn to widebody transport Y. This action was not enough to maintain the required sep. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter's experience level and proximity of aircraft was determined. Reporter stated that she was unaware of a requirement for her to point out the traffic to the radar controller and to start a track on all pointouts. She knows now and stated that she learned a great deal from this system error. The key mistakes made were not showing the pointout to her radar controller and not starting a track. If she had done either one, the less than standard separation incident would not have happened.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION WHEN A CLIMBING ACR-WDB IS ALLOWED TO CONFLICT WITH AN OPPOSITE DIRECTION ACR-MLG DEVIATING FOR WX.

Narrative: ZLA D-33 CTLR ACCEPTED A POINTOUT FROM ZDV SECTOR 37 ON MLG X AT FL350, 30 MI SE OF BCE (REFERENCE POINT) DEVIATION S FOR WX, THEN DIRECT BRYCE CANYON. THE D33 CTLR (MYSELF) JUDGED INCORRECTLY THAT MLG X WAS NOT TFC FOR ANY ACFT UNDER SECTOR 33'S CTL AND WOULD NOT ENTER 33'S AIRSPACE. THIS DECISION WAS BASED ON HOW THE PREVIOUS ACFT HAD DEVIATED, SINCE THE RADAR WAS NOT DEPICTING ANY WX AT ALL. I FELT IT WAS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT THIS ACFT WOULD DEVIATE THE SAME WAY. CONSEQUENTLY I NEITHER ALERTED THE R33 CTLR TO THE POINTOUT, NOR DID I START A TRACK. 4 MINS AFTER ACCEPTING THE POINTOUT I WAS ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER SECTOR, JUST PRIOR TO THE OCCURRENCE. SECS BEFORE THE OCCURRENCE ZDV SECTOR 37 CALLED THE R33 CTLR, WHO WAS NOW 'ONE HOLED,' AND WANTED TO KNOW IF HE WAS TURNING WDB Y (A LAS DEP FLASHING HDOF TO ZDV, CLIMBING TO FL370 GOING DIRECT PAWNEE CITY), WHO WAS OUT OF FL352 FOR FL370, AND IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH MLG X. AT THIS TIME THE R33 CTLR NOTICED THE LIMITED DATA BLOCK AND ISSUED A 30 DEG TURN TO WDB Y. THIS ACTION WAS NOT ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN THE REQUIRED SEP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR'S EXPERIENCE LEVEL AND PROX OF ACFT WAS DETERMINED. RPTR STATED THAT SHE WAS UNAWARE OF A REQUIREMENT FOR HER TO POINT OUT THE TFC TO THE RADAR CTLR AND TO START A TRACK ON ALL POINTOUTS. SHE KNOWS NOW AND STATED THAT SHE LEARNED A GREAT DEAL FROM THIS SYS ERROR. THE KEY MISTAKES MADE WERE NOT SHOWING THE POINTOUT TO HER RADAR CTLR AND NOT STARTING A TRACK. IF SHE HAD DONE EITHER ONE, THE LTSS INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.