Narrative:

After being turned over to bdl approach we were given a turn towards a downwind for an ILS to runway 24 at bdl. There was a tremendous amount of congestion on this frequency and we were unable to acknowledge the transmission. Our next clearance was an additional vector and a descent to 3000'. We left 7000' and initiated the turn. Leaving 5500' we thought that we heard our call sign with a clearance to maintain 5000'. We leveled at 5000' and attempted to clarify our clearance. The controller was talking nonstop and we could not obtain a clarification. We did hear the controller work a flight at 4000' that might have been in our area. Next came a clearance for an additional turn. We initiated the turn and tried in vain to acknowledge this and to clarify the altitude assignment. The controller came back with a second and third request for this heading, finally on his third attempt we were able to acknowledge the new heading and clarify that our altitude assignment was 5000'. This situation could have been quite hazardous if we did not happen to catch that small part of our clearance to stop at 5000'. There was such a length of time between the time that I thought I heard the clearance and our clarification of it that we could easily have continued the descent to 3000' (my first officer heard none of the clearance while I heard the last 2 digits of our flight number). Following the incident I was able to speak to the controller. It was then apparent that he had several equipment problems at this time. At the time of our clearance to stop descent at 5000', he began losing targets on his scope so that he could not verify that we had responded and with the frequency congestion he had a very serious situation on his hands. Fortunately this controller was experienced and once the equipment problems were worked out he was able to get out of the weeds. The solution: more fully qualified controllers, better equipment and better radio discipline.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: APCH CTLR OVERLOADED AND NOT TAKING TIME FOR FLT CREW TO READ BACK AND ACKNOWLEDGE CLRNC.

Narrative: AFTER BEING TURNED OVER TO BDL APCH WE WERE GIVEN A TURN TOWARDS A DOWNWIND FOR AN ILS TO RWY 24 AT BDL. THERE WAS A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF CONGESTION ON THIS FREQ AND WE WERE UNABLE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE XMISSION. OUR NEXT CLRNC WAS AN ADDITIONAL VECTOR AND A DSCNT TO 3000'. WE LEFT 7000' AND INITIATED THE TURN. LEAVING 5500' WE THOUGHT THAT WE HEARD OUR CALL SIGN WITH A CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 5000'. WE LEVELED AT 5000' AND ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY OUR CLRNC. THE CTLR WAS TALKING NONSTOP AND WE COULD NOT OBTAIN A CLARIFICATION. WE DID HEAR THE CTLR WORK A FLT AT 4000' THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN OUR AREA. NEXT CAME A CLRNC FOR AN ADDITIONAL TURN. WE INITIATED THE TURN AND TRIED IN VAIN TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS AND TO CLARIFY THE ALT ASSIGNMENT. THE CTLR CAME BACK WITH A SECOND AND THIRD REQUEST FOR THIS HDG, FINALLY ON HIS THIRD ATTEMPT WE WERE ABLE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEW HDG AND CLARIFY THAT OUR ALT ASSIGNMENT WAS 5000'. THIS SITUATION COULD HAVE BEEN QUITE HAZARDOUS IF WE DID NOT HAPPEN TO CATCH THAT SMALL PART OF OUR CLRNC TO STOP AT 5000'. THERE WAS SUCH A LENGTH OF TIME BTWN THE TIME THAT I THOUGHT I HEARD THE CLRNC AND OUR CLARIFICATION OF IT THAT WE COULD EASILY HAVE CONTINUED THE DSCNT TO 3000' (MY F/O HEARD NONE OF THE CLRNC WHILE I HEARD THE LAST 2 DIGITS OF OUR FLT NUMBER). FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT I WAS ABLE TO SPEAK TO THE CTLR. IT WAS THEN APPARENT THAT HE HAD SEVERAL EQUIP PROBS AT THIS TIME. AT THE TIME OF OUR CLRNC TO STOP DSCNT AT 5000', HE BEGAN LOSING TARGETS ON HIS SCOPE SO THAT HE COULD NOT VERIFY THAT WE HAD RESPONDED AND WITH THE FREQ CONGESTION HE HAD A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION ON HIS HANDS. FORTUNATELY THIS CTLR WAS EXPERIENCED AND ONCE THE EQUIP PROBS WERE WORKED OUT HE WAS ABLE TO GET OUT OF THE WEEDS. THE SOLUTION: MORE FULLY QUALIFIED CTLRS, BETTER EQUIP AND BETTER RADIO DISCIPLINE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.