Narrative:

I came to relieve the liberty east departure position and was briefed on an aircraft (air carrier X) that had departed hpn without a flight plan. I was also briefed that hpn tower was working on air carrier X's flight plan to cyul. I assumed the position without accepting the hand off from nyack; an adjacent departure position. While I did have other aircraft on my frequency; it was low volume and not complicated. With this in mind; I decided to call nyack and ask for air carrier X's destination so that I could make an attempt to coordinate a route of flight for air carrier X with ZBW-dxr. I still did not accept the hand off. I called nyack a second time to verify air carrier X's destination. It was at this time that I recognized that nyack was dealing with a higher volume of traffic and seemingly more complicated with air carrier X on their frequency. Consequently; in an attempt to assist a fellow controller; I accepted the hand off on air carrier X. I then called ZBW-dxr informing them of air carrier X (position; call sign; beacon code; destination) and his lack of a flight plan. ZBW-dxr acknowledged that they had no information on air carrier X. I climbed air carrier X from 11;000 to 14;000 ft and he was speed restricted to 250 KTS by nyack in order to allow more time to enter the flight plan into the system. A controller from the lga sector provided me with a new beacon code for air carrier X; but no flight plan strip. I issued air carrier X the new squawk and terminated the old tag. I immediately called ZBW-dxr to notify them of the new beacon code and that the flight plan had been processed. Again; they said they had no information on air carrier X. I decided to allow a minute for air carrier X's flight plan to register in the system. During this time; air carrier X's new tag did not auto acquire; so I entered in manually. It was also during this time that I began to call for assistance from my supervisor; because I still did not have the full route clearance for air carrier X. However; as the east position has been relocated; we were separated by 5 departure scopes and 6 or 7 controllers stood between us (ewr departure; ewr departure hand off; west departure; west departure hand off; lga departure; lga departure hand off; etc.) further still; the nyack position; which was previously located no more than 10 ft from east departure where information (flight strips) could be quickly and efficiently exchanged; is currently on the complete opposite side of the control room floor. I made 3 attempts to call for assistance. With no acknowledgment; I decided to call ZBW-dxr a third time hoping they had received the flight plan information on air carrier X and again; they had no information and asked me the route of flight; which I did not have readily available. At this point I decided to hold air carrier X in my airspace until I received assistance and the information ZBW-dxr needed. I stood up; called for assistance a fourth time; like a relay; I called out to flight data to call the supervisor for me. In the meantime and between time; I had 4 or 5 other aircraft under my control; two of which were air carrier Y (lga to bos via merit) and air carrier Z (teb to mvy via bayys). On initial contact; I climbed air carrier Z (requesting 17;000 ft as a final altitude) to 12;000 ft with the intention of topping him with air carrier Y (requesting FL210 as a final altitude). I proceeded to climb air carrier Y to 17;000 ft and put him on course to merit. Shortly after; due to the distraction caused by air carrier X as well as standing up and calling across the control room floor for assistance; I uncharacteristically climbed air carrier Z to 17;000 ft; put him on course to bayys intersection; and gave him a frequency change (to ZBW-dxr). They were on converging courses. I recognized this; and thinking I had also given air carrier Y a frequency change; I immediately called ZBW-dxr with control instructions to avoid a loss of separation; near miss; or worse. ZBW-dxr called back stating they did not have air carrier Y on their frequency. Realizing I still had control of air carrier Y; I immediately turned him left to a 360 heading and issued him traffic (air carrier Z); which he said he had in sight. I then gave air carrier Y instructions to maintain visual separation with the citation and called ZBW-dxr to inform them that air carrier Y had air carrier Z in sight. What should have been a routine operation became unnecessarily complicated; distracting; and dangerous. The two factors that most contributed to this event were air carrier X's release without a flight plan and the division of the liberty sector scopes; away from each other and away from positions in other sectors with adjacent airspace. Airplanes should not be allowed to depart IFR without flight plans. Notification of an aircraft with an expired flight plan should be more effective on the ground so that they are not mistakenly released. Reconsider the physical layout of the control room floor for more effective communications between positions with airspace adjacent to one another or have the north and east positions continually staffed with a hand off.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: N90 Controller described a probable airspace infraction and possible separation event; listing the fact that an IFR aircraft was allowed to depart without flight plan verification and new control room layout as causal factors.

Narrative: I came to relieve the Liberty East Departure position and was briefed on an aircraft (Air Carrier X) that had departed HPN without a flight plan. I was also briefed that HPN Tower was working on Air Carrier X's flight plan to CYUL. I assumed the position without accepting the hand off from NYACK; an adjacent departure position. While I did have other aircraft on my frequency; it was low volume and not complicated. With this in mind; I decided to call NYACK and ask for Air Carrier X's destination so that I could make an attempt to coordinate a route of flight for Air Carrier X with ZBW-DXR. I still did not accept the hand off. I called NYACK a second time to verify Air Carrier X's destination. It was at this time that I recognized that NYACK was dealing with a higher volume of traffic and seemingly more complicated with Air Carrier X on their frequency. Consequently; in an attempt to assist a fellow Controller; I accepted the hand off on Air Carrier X. I then called ZBW-DXR informing them of Air Carrier X (position; call sign; beacon code; destination) and his lack of a flight plan. ZBW-DXR acknowledged that they had no information on Air Carrier X. I climbed Air Carrier X from 11;000 to 14;000 FT and he was speed restricted to 250 KTS by NYACK in order to allow more time to enter the flight plan into the system. A Controller from the LGA sector provided me with a new beacon code for Air Carrier X; but no flight plan strip. I issued Air Carrier X the new squawk and terminated the old tag. I immediately called ZBW-DXR to notify them of the new beacon code and that the flight plan had been processed. Again; they said they had no information on Air Carrier X. I decided to allow a minute for Air Carrier X's flight plan to register in the system. During this time; Air Carrier X's new tag did not auto acquire; so I entered in manually. It was also during this time that I began to call for assistance from my Supervisor; because I still did not have the full route clearance for Air Carrier X. However; as the East position has been relocated; we were separated by 5 departure scopes and 6 or 7 controllers stood between us (EWR Departure; EWR Departure hand off; West Departure; West Departure hand off; LGA Departure; LGA Departure hand off; etc.) Further still; the NYACK position; which was previously located no more than 10 FT from East Departure where information (flight strips) could be quickly and efficiently exchanged; is currently on the complete opposite side of the control room floor. I made 3 attempts to call for assistance. With no acknowledgment; I decided to call ZBW-DXR a third time hoping they had received the flight plan information on Air Carrier X and again; they had no information and asked me the route of flight; which I did not have readily available. At this point I decided to hold Air Carrier X in my airspace until I received assistance and the information ZBW-DXR needed. I stood up; called for assistance a fourth time; like a relay; I called out to Flight Data to call the Supervisor for me. In the meantime and between time; I had 4 or 5 other aircraft under my control; two of which were Air Carrier Y (LGA to BOS via MERIT) and Air Carrier Z (TEB to MVY via BAYYS). On initial contact; I climbed Air Carrier Z (requesting 17;000 FT as a final altitude) to 12;000 FT with the intention of topping him with Air Carrier Y (requesting FL210 as a final altitude). I proceeded to climb Air Carrier Y to 17;000 FT and put him on course to MERIT. Shortly after; due to the distraction caused by Air Carrier X as well as standing up and calling across the control room floor for assistance; I uncharacteristically climbed Air Carrier Z to 17;000 FT; put him on course to BAYYS intersection; and gave him a frequency change (to ZBW-DXR). They were on converging courses. I recognized this; and thinking I had also given Air Carrier Y a frequency change; I immediately called ZBW-DXR with control instructions to avoid a loss of separation; near miss; or worse. ZBW-DXR called back stating they did not have Air Carrier Y on their frequency. Realizing I still had control of Air Carrier Y; I immediately turned him left to a 360 heading and issued him traffic (Air Carrier Z); which he said he had in sight. I then gave Air Carrier Y instructions to maintain visual separation with the Citation and called ZBW-DXR to inform them that Air Carrier Y had Air Carrier Z in sight. What should have been a routine operation became unnecessarily complicated; distracting; and dangerous. The two factors that most contributed to this event were Air Carrier X's release without a flight plan and the division of the Liberty Sector scopes; away from each other and away from positions in other sectors with adjacent airspace. Airplanes should not be allowed to depart IFR without flight plans. Notification of an aircraft with an expired flight plan should be more effective on the ground so that they are not mistakenly released. Reconsider the physical layout of the control room floor for more effective communications between positions with airspace adjacent to one another or have the North and East positions continually staffed with a hand off.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.