Narrative:

I was cleared into position and hold runway 9L at mia. Conditions were night with heavy rainshowers from nearby thunderstorms. Mia was, as usual, very busy. I was unfamiliar with the airport, but on IFR flight plan. Immediately after taxiing onto 9L, I was told to taxi across 9L (at L2 intersection), in front of air carrier turboprop and behind an large transport and position and hold on runway 12. I taxied across 9L and onto a ramp area where several aircraft were holding for runway 9L. There were no taxi lines to follow but the tower controller told me to make a slight left, then right turn to get to runway 12. I saw the runway and was attempting to taxi there, but did not see the edge of the ramp and taxied off the tarmac with 1 wheel, which made a thump as the strut bottomed out. The aircraft taxied and ran-up fine, and I made an uneventful short flight. However, an inspection of the aircraft after flight disclosed a minor propeller strike on 1 of 3 blades on right engine. The passenger sitting in the right front seat was unsure whether a blue taxi light had been damaged/hit. I was unaware of this. Analysis: improper taxi procedures, especially accepting a taxi clearance under adverse conditions (night, unfamiliar high density airport, rain, bad WX) without knowing exactly where to go beforehand. I had an airport diagram aboard and should have used it. I also could have cleared 9L and then held position before proceeding between aircraft to try and get immediately to 12. Improper night taxi procedures, failure to see and recognize taxiway edge. Perceived pressure of holding up operations at busy airport increasing 'urgency' of immediately accepting another 'position and hold' clearance as well as probably taxiing too fast. Improper crew coordination: right seat passenger was pilot (low time) but should have been instructed by me to help locate txwys, aircraft, runways, etc. Talking to him later, he didn't want to volunteer information he thought I already knew or disturb me. He should have been made to feel his contributions would be appreciated by the pilot (me). Decision to takeoff -- I didn't know that I had damaged the aircraft prior to takeoff, however, I should have immediately taxied back to parking for thorough inspection prior to takeoff as soon as something unusual happened. I was caught in the 'flow of going' and didn't stop to adequately consider all the possibilities.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SMT PLT SLIGHTLY DAMAGED 1 OF HIS PROP BLADES ON A TXWY LIGHT.

Narrative: I WAS CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 9L AT MIA. CONDITIONS WERE NIGHT WITH HVY RAINSHOWERS FROM NEARBY TSTMS. MIA WAS, AS USUAL, VERY BUSY. I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT, BUT ON IFR FLT PLAN. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAXIING ONTO 9L, I WAS TOLD TO TAXI ACROSS 9L (AT L2 INTXN), IN FRONT OF ACR TURBOPROP AND BEHIND AN LGT AND POS AND HOLD ON RWY 12. I TAXIED ACROSS 9L AND ONTO A RAMP AREA WHERE SEVERAL ACFT WERE HOLDING FOR RWY 9L. THERE WERE NO TAXI LINES TO FOLLOW BUT THE TWR CTLR TOLD ME TO MAKE A SLIGHT L, THEN R TURN TO GET TO RWY 12. I SAW THE RWY AND WAS ATTEMPTING TO TAXI THERE, BUT DID NOT SEE THE EDGE OF THE RAMP AND TAXIED OFF THE TARMAC WITH 1 WHEEL, WHICH MADE A THUMP AS THE STRUT BOTTOMED OUT. THE ACFT TAXIED AND RAN-UP FINE, AND I MADE AN UNEVENTFUL SHORT FLT. HOWEVER, AN INSPECTION OF THE ACFT AFTER FLT DISCLOSED A MINOR PROP STRIKE ON 1 OF 3 BLADES ON R ENG. THE PAX SITTING IN THE R FRONT SEAT WAS UNSURE WHETHER A BLUE TAXI LIGHT HAD BEEN DAMAGED/HIT. I WAS UNAWARE OF THIS. ANALYSIS: IMPROPER TAXI PROCS, ESPECIALLY ACCEPTING A TAXI CLRNC UNDER ADVERSE CONDITIONS (NIGHT, UNFAMILIAR HIGH DENSITY ARPT, RAIN, BAD WX) WITHOUT KNOWING EXACTLY WHERE TO GO BEFOREHAND. I HAD AN ARPT DIAGRAM ABOARD AND SHOULD HAVE USED IT. I ALSO COULD HAVE CLRED 9L AND THEN HELD POS BEFORE PROCEEDING BTWN ACFT TO TRY AND GET IMMEDIATELY TO 12. IMPROPER NIGHT TAXI PROCS, FAILURE TO SEE AND RECOGNIZE TXWY EDGE. PERCEIVED PRESSURE OF HOLDING UP OPS AT BUSY ARPT INCREASING 'URGENCY' OF IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTING ANOTHER 'POS AND HOLD' CLRNC AS WELL AS PROBABLY TAXIING TOO FAST. IMPROPER CREW COORD: R SEAT PAX WAS PLT (LOW TIME) BUT SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY ME TO HELP LOCATE TXWYS, ACFT, RWYS, ETC. TALKING TO HIM LATER, HE DIDN'T WANT TO VOLUNTEER INFO HE THOUGHT I ALREADY KNEW OR DISTURB ME. HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE TO FEEL HIS CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD BE APPRECIATED BY THE PLT (ME). DECISION TO TKOF -- I DIDN'T KNOW THAT I HAD DAMAGED THE ACFT PRIOR TO TKOF, HOWEVER, I SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY TAXIED BACK TO PARKING FOR THOROUGH INSPECTION PRIOR TO TKOF AS SOON AS SOMETHING UNUSUAL HAPPENED. I WAS CAUGHT IN THE 'FLOW OF GOING' AND DIDN'T STOP TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER ALL THE POSSIBILITIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.