Narrative:

Crew failed to switch to tower frequency prior to landing. Aircraft was on approach control frequency and landed on runway without 2-WAY communication with tower. Landing and roll out was uneventful. The approach to runway 8L at hnl was initiated IFR because a light cloud cover at approximately 3500 ft prevented visual acquisition of the field. A visual approach was requested after turning to a final heading and descent below the clouds. We were advised by approach control to switch to the tower 'at makakilo' but were not given clearance for a 'visual' approach as requested. I then queried the approach controller in order to obtain visual clearance. Visual clearance was then obtained. At this point we were approximately 12 mi from the runway. This was the first time in 5 yrs of flying inter-island that I had ever heard a controller use makakilo as a reporting point and I therefore asked the captain where exactly it was. There was then a discussion between us regarding the location of makakilo. Previously, approach control used barbers point (approximately 8-9 NM), or ewabe (approximately 6 NM) as reference points. At approximately 10 NM the captain initiated the transition to the landing confign and, during this transition, numerous targets appeared on the TCASII which required visual identify. Landing checks were completed in proper order. The switch to tower frequency at 'makakilo' was missed. At approximately 3 NM from the runway the TCASII gave a 'traffic' alert to a target that could not be visually idented. The alert then became a command to climb. As was the case before, no traffic was visible and the decision was made to continue. It should be noted that, at the position where the TCASII began to give us an alert, it is a relatively common occurrence to get alerts and commands. These are caused by navy ships, VFR traffic entering hnl and hickam AFB ground traffic. The aircraft continued on to landing and, on landing roll out, it was discovered that the VHF communication radio was on approach frequency. After clearing the runway we notified ground that we were clear of the runway and were advised to taxi to our ramp. There was no further discussion with ATC. The problem arose at the beginning of the approach with the need to clarify the type of approach. Our distraction was then fueled with confusion over the use of an uncommon reporting point and then, during the final approach, when we most likely would have caught our error, were further distracted by TCASII. Added together, these factors caused 2 highly experienced pilots to make a serious mistake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLRNC LNDG NOT RECEIVED. UNAUTH LNDG.

Narrative: CREW FAILED TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ PRIOR TO LNDG. ACFT WAS ON APCH CTL FREQ AND LANDED ON RWY WITHOUT 2-WAY COM WITH TWR. LNDG AND ROLL OUT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE APCH TO RWY 8L AT HNL WAS INITIATED IFR BECAUSE A LIGHT CLOUD COVER AT APPROX 3500 FT PREVENTED VISUAL ACQUISITION OF THE FIELD. A VISUAL APCH WAS REQUESTED AFTER TURNING TO A FINAL HDG AND DSCNT BELOW THE CLOUDS. WE WERE ADVISED BY APCH CTL TO SWITCH TO THE TWR 'AT MAKAKILO' BUT WERE NOT GIVEN CLRNC FOR A 'VISUAL' APCH AS REQUESTED. I THEN QUERIED THE APCH CTLR IN ORDER TO OBTAIN VISUAL CLRNC. VISUAL CLRNC WAS THEN OBTAINED. AT THIS POINT WE WERE APPROX 12 MI FROM THE RWY. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IN 5 YRS OF FLYING INTER-ISLAND THAT I HAD EVER HEARD A CTLR USE MAKAKILO AS A RPTING POINT AND I THEREFORE ASKED THE CAPT WHERE EXACTLY IT WAS. THERE WAS THEN A DISCUSSION BTWN US REGARDING THE LOCATION OF MAKAKILO. PREVIOUSLY, APCH CTL USED BARBERS POINT (APPROX 8-9 NM), OR EWABE (APPROX 6 NM) AS REF POINTS. AT APPROX 10 NM THE CAPT INITIATED THE TRANSITION TO THE LNDG CONFIGN AND, DURING THIS TRANSITION, NUMEROUS TARGETS APPEARED ON THE TCASII WHICH REQUIRED VISUAL IDENT. LNDG CHKS WERE COMPLETED IN PROPER ORDER. THE SWITCH TO TWR FREQ AT 'MAKAKILO' WAS MISSED. AT APPROX 3 NM FROM THE RWY THE TCASII GAVE A 'TFC' ALERT TO A TARGET THAT COULD NOT BE VISUALLY IDENTED. THE ALERT THEN BECAME A COMMAND TO CLB. AS WAS THE CASE BEFORE, NO TFC WAS VISIBLE AND THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CONTINUE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, AT THE POS WHERE THE TCASII BEGAN TO GIVE US AN ALERT, IT IS A RELATIVELY COMMON OCCURRENCE TO GET ALERTS AND COMMANDS. THESE ARE CAUSED BY NAVY SHIPS, VFR TFC ENTERING HNL AND HICKAM AFB GND TFC. THE ACFT CONTINUED ON TO LNDG AND, ON LNDG ROLL OUT, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE VHF COM RADIO WAS ON APCH FREQ. AFTER CLRING THE RWY WE NOTIFIED GND THAT WE WERE CLR OF THE RWY AND WERE ADVISED TO TAXI TO OUR RAMP. THERE WAS NO FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ATC. THE PROB AROSE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE APCH WITH THE NEED TO CLARIFY THE TYPE OF APCH. OUR DISTR WAS THEN FUELED WITH CONFUSION OVER THE USE OF AN UNCOMMON RPTING POINT AND THEN, DURING THE FINAL APCH, WHEN WE MOST LIKELY WOULD HAVE CAUGHT OUR ERROR, WERE FURTHER DISTRACTED BY TCASII. ADDED TOGETHER, THESE FACTORS CAUSED 2 HIGHLY EXPERIENCED PLTS TO MAKE A SERIOUS MISTAKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.