Narrative:

About this same time I began to have radio difficulties later discovered to be a failed push-to-talk switch on the pilot's yoke. All this time, I suppose sheppard was recovering their military training jets on UHF, although I was never given any reason for the tooling around. Finally I was given clearance to leave the VOR on a heading of 100 degrees to runway 17. I flew a heading of 100 degrees as directed which, with the strong south wind, blew me to a position about 3/4 of a mi off the threshold of runway 15R and still not aligned with runway 17, but right in front of an air carrier turboprop landing on runway 15R. The air carrier captain saw me first, then the tower gave us both a 360 degree turn -- a traffic separation procedure that I still fail to fully understand. I first saw the air carrier aircraft after I had completed approximately 150 degrees of a steep right turn. I spoke to the captain of the air carrier aircraft on the ground after the incident, and he speculated that we had repeatedly cut each other out on the radio. Considering the problems I was having with the transmit button, I agree. Relevant observations: I became distracted by my wife's motion sickness. The 'fly heading 100 degrees to land runway 17' procedure should be reevaluated. I flew it again in good WX on jan/sun/96 and found that it approached the very threshold on a base with no final approach. A more reliable ground track would be achieved flying the sps 100 degree radial. I believe that I am the single person most responsible for this incident and that the air carrier crew was most responsible for recognizing the conflict and resolving it. The following observation does nothing to change that. The tower and approach radar crews at sheppard seem inexperienced and act in a rote fashion rather than in the more intellectual fashion borne of experience.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A GA PLT ON A VECTOR HDG TO INTERCEPT THE APCH TO RWY 17 AT SPS CROSSES INTO THE PATH OF AN ACR ON APCH TO RWY 15R BECAUSE OF A STRONG SOUTHERLY WIND. THE ACR TAKES EVASIVE ACTION AND THE APCH CTLR PROVIDES NEW VECTORS.

Narrative: ABOUT THIS SAME TIME I BEGAN TO HAVE RADIO DIFFICULTIES LATER DISCOVERED TO BE A FAILED PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH ON THE PLT'S YOKE. ALL THIS TIME, I SUPPOSE SHEPPARD WAS RECOVERING THEIR MIL TRAINING JETS ON UHF, ALTHOUGH I WAS NEVER GIVEN ANY REASON FOR THE TOOLING AROUND. FINALLY I WAS GIVEN CLRNC TO LEAVE THE VOR ON A HDG OF 100 DEGS TO RWY 17. I FLEW A HDG OF 100 DEGS AS DIRECTED WHICH, WITH THE STRONG S WIND, BLEW ME TO A POS ABOUT 3/4 OF A MI OFF THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 15R AND STILL NOT ALIGNED WITH RWY 17, BUT RIGHT IN FRONT OF AN ACR TURBOPROP LNDG ON RWY 15R. THE ACR CAPT SAW ME FIRST, THEN THE TWR GAVE US BOTH A 360 DEG TURN -- A TFC SEPARATION PROC THAT I STILL FAIL TO FULLY UNDERSTAND. I FIRST SAW THE ACR ACFT AFTER I HAD COMPLETED APPROX 150 DEGS OF A STEEP R TURN. I SPOKE TO THE CAPT OF THE ACR ACFT ON THE GND AFTER THE INCIDENT, AND HE SPECULATED THAT WE HAD REPEATEDLY CUT EACH OTHER OUT ON THE RADIO. CONSIDERING THE PROBS I WAS HAVING WITH THE XMIT BUTTON, I AGREE. RELEVANT OBSERVATIONS: I BECAME DISTRACTED BY MY WIFE'S MOTION SICKNESS. THE 'FLY HDG 100 DEGS TO LAND RWY 17' PROC SHOULD BE REEVALUATED. I FLEW IT AGAIN IN GOOD WX ON JAN/SUN/96 AND FOUND THAT IT APCHED THE VERY THRESHOLD ON A BASE WITH NO FINAL APCH. A MORE RELIABLE GND TRACK WOULD BE ACHIEVED FLYING THE SPS 100 DEG RADIAL. I BELIEVE THAT I AM THE SINGLE PERSON MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS INCIDENT AND THAT THE ACR CREW WAS MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR RECOGNIZING THE CONFLICT AND RESOLVING IT. THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATION DOES NOTHING TO CHANGE THAT. THE TWR AND APCH RADAR CREWS AT SHEPPARD SEEM INEXPERIENCED AND ACT IN A ROTE FASHION RATHER THAN IN THE MORE INTELLECTUAL FASHION BORNE OF EXPERIENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.