Narrative:

On takeoff from the rapid city airport, the aircraft could not develop enough lift and landed adjacent to the runway. No one was injured and the aircraft sustained no damage as a result of the incident. 1/2 hour before the incident, I had landed on a crossing runway to the one that I used for takeoff. It was shorter (3600 ft) but the winds were aligned directly down the runway. The reports from the tower were that winds were out of the west at 25-26 KTS. After landing, and taking on fuel and 1 passenger for the trip, we taxied to runway 32. The winds were perpendicular to the runway. The density altitude was a bit over 5000 ft and the aircraft was within 100 pounds of gross weight. On roll, it required full aileron and full rudder deflection towards the wind to maintain directional control down the runway. I rotated at about 95 KTS and lifted off shortly after that. Immediately after liftoff the aircraft started to drift to the right pushing the aircraft away from the runway. In addition, the aircraft was not able to get out of ground effect. The aircraft landed adjacent to the runway and about 2/3 of the way down the runway. What contributed to the incident was a combination of 2 things with an overriding pre-planning issue. The 2 events that may have made a difference at takeoff were: 1) appropriate transition from ground to flight conditions. In visiting with the FAA following the incident, they indicated that the marks on the ground when the aircraft landed indicated that it was traveling straight, despite the perpendicular winds. This meant that the aircraft was slipping through the air and was not developing enough lift to carry it away from the surface. I believe that after transitioning to flight, I continued to hold full rudder deflection in an attempt to slip down the runway rather than crabbing into the wind. 2) accelerating to 'blue line' before takeoff. Speed could have allowed me to 'pop' off the runway giving me an additional measure of safety. The obvious planning issue would have been to accept the shorter runway given the strength of the winds. What I have learned from this incident are 2 things: 1) the most important thing I learned was that I didn't transition from ground to flight conditions when faced with significant xwinds. Failing to 'keep the ball in the middle' after I transitioned to flight created, for me, a 2 day FAA headache and a friendly reminder that WX can be unforgiving during those 'critical' moments in flight. 2) the FAA is not an advocate for the private pilot. Their approach was to find some way of 'nailing' me with a violation. After 2 days of interrogation by the FAA, they found that I was non compliant with 1 airworthiness directive for the aircraft. Coincident with the discovery, we had the FBO conduct the non compliant airworthiness directive inspection, and discovered no problem. Although their inspection does not excuse me from non compliance, this 1 airworthiness directive represented 3 pages of other airworthiness directives that were in compliance. I erred, because I used the service bulletin rather than the airworthiness directive for interping the interval of inspection.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT LANDS OFF RWY AT RAP AFTER BEING UNABLE TO CLB IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: ON TKOF FROM THE RAPID CITY ARPT, THE ACFT COULD NOT DEVELOP ENOUGH LIFT AND LANDED ADJACENT TO THE RWY. NO ONE WAS INJURED AND THE ACFT SUSTAINED NO DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT. 1/2 HR BEFORE THE INCIDENT, I HAD LANDED ON A XING RWY TO THE ONE THAT I USED FOR TKOF. IT WAS SHORTER (3600 FT) BUT THE WINDS WERE ALIGNED DIRECTLY DOWN THE RWY. THE RPTS FROM THE TWR WERE THAT WINDS WERE OUT OF THE W AT 25-26 KTS. AFTER LNDG, AND TAKING ON FUEL AND 1 PAX FOR THE TRIP, WE TAXIED TO RWY 32. THE WINDS WERE PERPENDICULAR TO THE RWY. THE DENSITY ALT WAS A BIT OVER 5000 FT AND THE ACFT WAS WITHIN 100 LBS OF GROSS WT. ON ROLL, IT REQUIRED FULL AILERON AND FULL RUDDER DEFLECTION TOWARDS THE WIND TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL DOWN THE RWY. I ROTATED AT ABOUT 95 KTS AND LIFTED OFF SHORTLY AFTER THAT. IMMEDIATELY AFTER LIFTOFF THE ACFT STARTED TO DRIFT TO THE R PUSHING THE ACFT AWAY FROM THE RWY. IN ADDITION, THE ACFT WAS NOT ABLE TO GET OUT OF GND EFFECT. THE ACFT LANDED ADJACENT TO THE RWY AND ABOUT 2/3 OF THE WAY DOWN THE RWY. WHAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT WAS A COMBINATION OF 2 THINGS WITH AN OVERRIDING PRE-PLANNING ISSUE. THE 2 EVENTS THAT MAY HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE AT TKOF WERE: 1) APPROPRIATE TRANSITION FROM GND TO FLT CONDITIONS. IN VISITING WITH THE FAA FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT, THEY INDICATED THAT THE MARKS ON THE GND WHEN THE ACFT LANDED INDICATED THAT IT WAS TRAVELING STRAIGHT, DESPITE THE PERPENDICULAR WINDS. THIS MEANT THAT THE ACFT WAS SLIPPING THROUGH THE AIR AND WAS NOT DEVELOPING ENOUGH LIFT TO CARRY IT AWAY FROM THE SURFACE. I BELIEVE THAT AFTER TRANSITIONING TO FLT, I CONTINUED TO HOLD FULL RUDDER DEFLECTION IN AN ATTEMPT TO SLIP DOWN THE RWY RATHER THAN CRABBING INTO THE WIND. 2) ACCELERATING TO 'BLUE LINE' BEFORE TKOF. SPD COULD HAVE ALLOWED ME TO 'POP' OFF THE RWY GIVING ME AN ADDITIONAL MEASURE OF SAFETY. THE OBVIOUS PLANNING ISSUE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO ACCEPT THE SHORTER RWY GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF THE WINDS. WHAT I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS INCIDENT ARE 2 THINGS: 1) THE MOST IMPORTANT THING I LEARNED WAS THAT I DIDN'T TRANSITION FROM GND TO FLT CONDITIONS WHEN FACED WITH SIGNIFICANT XWINDS. FAILING TO 'KEEP THE BALL IN THE MIDDLE' AFTER I TRANSITIONED TO FLT CREATED, FOR ME, A 2 DAY FAA HEADACHE AND A FRIENDLY REMINDER THAT WX CAN BE UNFORGIVING DURING THOSE 'CRITICAL' MOMENTS IN FLT. 2) THE FAA IS NOT AN ADVOCATE FOR THE PVT PLT. THEIR APCH WAS TO FIND SOME WAY OF 'NAILING' ME WITH A VIOLATION. AFTER 2 DAYS OF INTERROGATION BY THE FAA, THEY FOUND THAT I WAS NON COMPLIANT WITH 1 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE FOR THE ACFT. COINCIDENT WITH THE DISCOVERY, WE HAD THE FBO CONDUCT THE NON COMPLIANT AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE INSPECTION, AND DISCOVERED NO PROB. ALTHOUGH THEIR INSPECTION DOES NOT EXCUSE ME FROM NON COMPLIANCE, THIS 1 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE REPRESENTED 3 PAGES OF OTHER AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES THAT WERE IN COMPLIANCE. I ERRED, BECAUSE I USED THE SVC BULLETIN RATHER THAN THE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE FOR INTERPING THE INTERVAL OF INSPECTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.