Narrative:

I was departing hpn for flight to hto. No clouds, 30 mi visual. Friday eve, but virtually no traffic at hpn. Ground controller was having difficulty -- noted some misunderstandings with other aircraft, but my taxi clearance was ok to runway 34, full length. No other aircraft preparing for takeoff, two single engine trainers in pattern for runway 29, touch and go. Switched to tower, voice seemed to be same controller (1 controller manning clearance delivery, ground and tower?) called for takeoff clearance, right turn direct hto. Given 'position and hold.' acknowledged and taxied into position maybe 200 ft from approach threshold on centerline of runway. Traffic was to begin 1 mi final for runway 29, touch and go. While in position, heard beech jet checking and receive clearance for sound visual, runway 34 approach. When tobago cleared runway 29/34 intersection of was again airborne, tower cleared another aircraft to land runway 29, although more than sufficient space existed for my departure -- first clue he forgot I was in position. I did not then remind tower I was waiting, since I expected beech jet to still be about 5 min from landing. After second aircraft cleared runway 29/34 intersection, and tower did not clear me, I reminded him we were in position runway 34. Took 2 to 3 calls before he responded with 'go around' to beech jet, which 10 to 15 second later passed overhead 300 ft in climb. Beech jet pilot reported seeing me just as go around order came. No communication from beech jet from time of clearance for sound visual to action of go around. I expected he was no closer than a long final and was surprised that approach would have been continued to that point without landing clearance (which I do not recall hearing). My aircraft is light colored with red stripe, should stand out well against runway surface. Strobe and landing lights were on and aircraft visible to tower cabin attendant. Transponder on 'altitude,' squawking 1200 while in position and holding. My position on runway was between threshold and aiming point (GS transmitter) so beech probably would have passed overhead, but high probability of collision existed if he continued to land. Conclusion: situational awareness is dicey. Risk of collision was underestimated by me due to lack of position call outs by beech jet or tower clearance to land. Awareness would have been higher if traffic were greater, due to more data on where other aircraft were. When in position and hold for more than 1 operation ahead, consider reminding tower of positioning aircraft at an angle to see approach path. Position aircraft as close to threshold as practicable, so if there is a landing aircraft, there is greater chance of him landing beyond holding aircraft. Good days and light traffic are dangerous -- people get complacent! Be assertive with controllers. Risk of annoying him with a reminder is less than risk of collision. Be especially alert when one poor lonely controller is manning multiple positions. What the 2 pilots in beech jet were doing mystifies me, should have seen me and questioned tower long before being given go around instructions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA30 PLTS QUESTIONS HPN LC TO ALERT THAT HE IS POSITION AND HOLD FOR TKOF AS A BE40 IN ISSUED GAR ON SHORT FINAL.

Narrative: I WAS DEPARTING HPN FOR FLT TO HTO. NO CLOUDS, 30 MI VISUAL. FRIDAY EVE, BUT VIRTUALLY NO TFC AT HPN. GND CTLR WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY -- NOTED SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH OTHER ACFT, BUT MY TAXI CLRNC WAS OK TO RWY 34, FULL LENGTH. NO OTHER ACFT PREPARING FOR TKOF, TWO SINGLE ENGINE TRAINERS IN PATTERN FOR RWY 29, TOUCH AND GO. SWITCHED TO TWR, VOICE SEEMED TO BE SAME CTLR (1 CTLR MANNING CD, GND AND TWR?) CALLED FOR TKOF CLRNC, R TURN DIRECT HTO. GIVEN 'POSITION AND HOLD.' ACKNOWLEDGED AND TAXIED INTO POSITION MAYBE 200 FT FROM APCH THRESHOLD ON CTRLINE OF RWY. TFC WAS TO BEGIN 1 MI FINAL FOR RWY 29, TOUCH AND GO. WHILE IN POSITION, HEARD BEECH JET CHECKING AND RECEIVE CLRNC FOR SOUND VISUAL, RWY 34 APCH. WHEN TOBAGO CLRED RWY 29/34 INTXN OF WAS AGAIN AIRBORNE, TWR CLRED ANOTHER ACFT TO LAND RWY 29, ALTHOUGH MORE THAN SUFFICIENT SPACE EXISTED FOR MY DEP -- FIRST CLUE HE FORGOT I WAS IN POSITION. I DID NOT THEN REMIND TWR I WAS WAITING, SINCE I EXPECTED BEECH JET TO STILL BE ABOUT 5 MIN FROM LNDG. AFTER SECOND ACFT CLRED RWY 29/34 INTXN, AND TWR DID NOT CLR ME, I REMINDED HIM WE WERE IN POSITION RWY 34. TOOK 2 TO 3 CALLS BEFORE HE RESPONDED WITH 'GO AROUND' TO BEECH JET, WHICH 10 TO 15 SEC LATER PASSED OVERHEAD 300 FT IN CLIMB. BEECH JET PLT RPTED SEEING ME JUST AS GAR ORDER CAME. NO COM FROM BEECH JET FROM TIME OF CLRNC FOR SOUND VISUAL TO ACTION OF GAR. I EXPECTED HE WAS NO CLOSER THAN A LONG FINAL AND WAS SURPRISED THAT APCH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONTINUED TO THAT POINT WITHOUT LNDG CLRNC (WHICH I DO NOT RECALL HEARING). MY ACFT IS LIGHT COLORED WITH RED STRIPE, SHOULD STAND OUT WELL AGAINST RWY SURFACE. STROBE AND LNDG LIGHTS WERE ON AND ACFT VISIBLE TO TWR CAB. XPONDER ON 'ALT,' SQUAWKING 1200 WHILE IN POSITION AND HOLDING. MY POSITION ON RWY WAS BETWEEN THRESHOLD AND AIMING POINT (GS TRANSMITTER) SO BEECH PROBABLY WOULD HAVE PASSED OVERHEAD, BUT HIGH PROBABILITY OF COLLISION EXISTED IF HE CONTINUED TO LAND. CONCLUSION: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IS DICEY. RISK OF COLLISION WAS UNDERESTIMATED BY ME DUE TO LACK OF POSITION CALL OUTS BY BEECH JET OR TWR CLRNC TO LAND. AWARENESS WOULD HAVE BEEN HIGHER IF TFC WERE GREATER, DUE TO MORE DATA ON WHERE OTHER ACFT WERE. WHEN IN POSITION AND HOLD FOR MORE THAN 1 OP AHEAD, CONSIDER REMINDING TWR OF POSITIONING ACFT AT AN ANGLE TO SEE APCH PATH. POSITION ACFT AS CLOSE TO THRESHOLD AS PRACTICABLE, SO IF THERE IS A LNDG ACFT, THERE IS GREATER CHANCE OF HIM LNDG BEYOND HOLDING ACFT. GOOD DAYS AND LIGHT TFC ARE DANGEROUS -- PEOPLE GET COMPLACENT! BE ASSERTIVE WITH CTLRS. RISK OF ANNOYING HIM WITH A REMINDER IS LESS THAN RISK OF COLLISION. BE ESPECIALLY ALERT WHEN ONE POOR LONELY CTLR IS MANNING MULTIPLE POSITIONS. WHAT THE 2 PLTS IN BEECH JET WERE DOING MYSTIFIES ME, SHOULD HAVE SEEN ME AND QUESTIONED TWR LONG BEFORE BEING GIVEN GAR INSTRUCTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.