Narrative:

I checked in for the first flight of the trip this morning at XA00 and met the first officer. We reviewed the paperwork; noting that there were some 'minor' deferrals that were either cabin related or would have no impact on our operation. There was nothing noteworthy in the aircraft history. We arrived at the gate to find out that the aircraft was en route from the hangar after an overnight stay. After a delay for the ramp being closed for lightning; the aircraft arrived and we boarded. After I settled in; I noticed 2 ECAM alerts that were not normal. They were flight control flap system 2 and flight control slat system 2. This indicated a probable failure in the slat flap control computer 2. I put the maintenance code manual codes in the ACARS and notified maintenance per SOP. A few minutes later a mechanic showed up and examined the ECAM. He stated that he did not know which breakers to reset and would call another mechanic (right and east?). He mentioned as he left the cockpit that the slat flap control computer was deferrable. After brief thought; I turned to the first officer and stated that in the interest of safety; I could not accept a deferral of the slat flap control computer. After another few minutes; the original mechanic comes back with the avionics guy. They proceed to reset several circuit breaker's. The problem does not clear. They then pull the old fashioned airbus trick of de-powering the aircraft and 'rebooting' it. This does not work either. The original mechanic again mentions the deferral and I tell both of them that I refuse to fly the aircraft in this condition. The avionics guy is supportive and states that he is going to call for the new part. About 20 minutes later a supervisor shows up and states that the part has been replaced and the problem is fixed. I thank him and turn towards the cockpit when he casually mentions that the problem was that the slat flap control computer was not installed and there was a hole where it belonged. He explained that the hangar mechanics had robbed it for another aircraft and had intended to replace it on the gate. He further explained that the ramp closure had caused confusion and that they were 'going to get to it.' I stopped in my tracks and as calmly as I could; I explained that this caused great concern for me because when I planned the flight and arrived at the aircraft; I had a valid maintenance release document that made no mention of the issue with the slat flap control computer. He explained that they had a note in their maintenance computer to fix it and the aircraft would have never been allowed to leave without it. We then flew to ZZZ1 uneventfully. Here are the issues: 1) I had a valid maintenance release document even though one of the flight control computers was not installed on the aircraft. There was no indication to me of any open items in any of the pilot paperwork. 2) after I wrote up the faults I discovered; two mechanics troubleshot the problem not knowing that the computer wasn't even installed. Their troubleshooting included communication with the maintenance controller over the radio. Still; there was no mention that the computer was removed. If the problem was notated in some mysterious computer; maybe someone would have noticed. 3) our maintenance is stretched so thin that an aircraft is rushed out of the hangar at our largest hub with a flight control computer not installed. 4) a supervisor suggested deferring the problem despite the fact that there was some sort of notation in their computer mentioning the missing flight control computer. Too often lately; deferrals are being thrown at problems with what appears to be little troubleshooting. 5) if I had accepted the deferral how long would the aircraft have flown around with the slat flap control computer missing? Unfortunately more and more; I see a culture that is more interested in rushing aircraft off of the gate rather than taking the time to fix problems correctly. I feel that the line pilot is becoming the last line of defense.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 PILOT REPORTS THE ACFT ARRIVED AT THE GATE FROM MAINT WITH FLT CTL ECAMS DISPLAYED. THE SFCC (SLAT FLAP CONTROL COMPUTER) WAS NOT INSTALLED AND THERE WAS NO NOTATION IN THE ACFT LOG BOOK.

Narrative: I CHECKED IN FOR THE FIRST FLIGHT OF THE TRIP THIS MORNING AT XA00 AND MET THE FO. WE REVIEWED THE PAPERWORK; NOTING THAT THERE WERE SOME 'MINOR' DEFERRALS THAT WERE EITHER CABIN RELATED OR WOULD HAVE NO IMPACT ON OUR OPERATION. THERE WAS NOTHING NOTEWORTHY IN THE AIRCRAFT HISTORY. WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE TO FIND OUT THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS ENRTE FROM THE HANGAR AFTER AN OVERNIGHT STAY. AFTER A DELAY FOR THE RAMP BEING CLOSED FOR LIGHTNING; THE AIRCRAFT ARRIVED AND WE BOARDED. AFTER I SETTLED IN; I NOTICED 2 ECAM ALERTS THAT WERE NOT NORMAL. THEY WERE FLT CTL FLAP SYS 2 AND FLT CTL SLAT SYS 2. THIS INDICATED A PROBABLE FAILURE IN THE SLAT FLAP CTL COMPUTER 2. I PUT THE MAINT CODE MANUAL CODES IN THE ACARS AND NOTIFIED MAINTENANCE PER SOP. A FEW MINUTES LATER A MECHANIC SHOWED UP AND EXAMINED THE ECAM. HE STATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHICH BREAKERS TO RESET AND WOULD CALL ANOTHER MECHANIC (R AND E?). HE MENTIONED AS HE LEFT THE COCKPIT THAT THE SLAT FLAP CTL COMPUTER WAS DEFERRABLE. AFTER BRIEF THOUGHT; I TURNED TO THE FO AND STATED THAT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY; I COULD NOT ACCEPT A DEFERRAL OF THE SLAT FLAP CTL COMPUTER. AFTER ANOTHER FEW MINUTES; THE ORIGINAL MECHANIC COMES BACK WITH THE AVIONICS GUY. THEY PROCEED TO RESET SEVERAL CB'S. THE PROBLEM DOES NOT CLEAR. THEY THEN PULL THE OLD FASHIONED AIRBUS TRICK OF DE-POWERING THE AIRCRAFT AND 'REBOOTING' IT. THIS DOES NOT WORK EITHER. THE ORIGINAL MECHANIC AGAIN MENTIONS THE DEFERRAL AND I TELL BOTH OF THEM THAT I REFUSE TO FLY THE AIRCRAFT IN THIS CONDITION. THE AVIONICS GUY IS SUPPORTIVE AND STATES THAT HE IS GOING TO CALL FOR THE NEW PART. ABOUT 20 MINUTES LATER A SUPERVISOR SHOWS UP AND STATES THAT THE PART HAS BEEN REPLACED AND THE PROBLEM IS FIXED. I THANK HIM AND TURN TOWARDS THE COCKPIT WHEN HE CASUALLY MENTIONS THAT THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE SLAT FLAP CTL COMPUTER WAS NOT INSTALLED AND THERE WAS A HOLE WHERE IT BELONGED. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE HANGAR MECHANICS HAD ROBBED IT FOR ANOTHER AIRCRAFT AND HAD INTENDED TO REPLACE IT ON THE GATE. HE FURTHER EXPLAINED THAT THE RAMP CLOSURE HAD CAUSED CONFUSION AND THAT THEY WERE 'GOING TO GET TO IT.' I STOPPED IN MY TRACKS AND AS CALMLY AS I COULD; I EXPLAINED THAT THIS CAUSED GREAT CONCERN FOR ME BECAUSE WHEN I PLANNED THE FLIGHT AND ARRIVED AT THE AIRCRAFT; I HAD A VALID MAINT RELEASE DOCUMENT THAT MADE NO MENTION OF THE ISSUE WITH THE SLAT FLAP CTL COMPUTER. HE EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAD A NOTE IN THEIR MAINTENANCE COMPUTER TO FIX IT AND THE AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE NEVER BEEN ALLOWED TO LEAVE WITHOUT IT. WE THEN FLEW TO ZZZ1 UNEVENTFULLY. HERE ARE THE ISSUES: 1) I HAD A VALID MAINT RELEASE DOCUMENT EVEN THOUGH ONE OF THE FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTERS WAS NOT INSTALLED ON THE AIRCRAFT. THERE WAS NO INDICATION TO ME OF ANY OPEN ITEMS IN ANY OF THE PILOT PAPERWORK. 2) AFTER I WROTE UP THE FAULTS I DISCOVERED; TWO MECHANICS TROUBLESHOT THE PROBLEM NOT KNOWING THAT THE COMPUTER WASN'T EVEN INSTALLED. THEIR TROUBLESHOOTING INCLUDED COMMUNICATION WITH THE MAINTENANCE CONTROLLER OVER THE RADIO. STILL; THERE WAS NO MENTION THAT THE COMPUTER WAS REMOVED. IF THE PROBLEM WAS NOTATED IN SOME MYSTERIOUS COMPUTER; MAYBE SOMEONE WOULD HAVE NOTICED. 3) OUR MAINTENANCE IS STRETCHED SO THIN THAT AN AIRCRAFT IS RUSHED OUT OF THE HANGAR AT OUR LARGEST HUB WITH A FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTER NOT INSTALLED. 4) A SUPERVISOR SUGGESTED DEFERRING THE PROBLEM DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS SOME SORT OF NOTATION IN THEIR COMPUTER MENTIONING THE MISSING FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTER. TOO OFTEN LATELY; DEFERRALS ARE BEING THROWN AT PROBLEMS WITH WHAT APPEARS TO BE LITTLE TROUBLESHOOTING. 5) IF I HAD ACCEPTED THE DEFERRAL HOW LONG WOULD THE AIRCRAFT HAVE FLOWN AROUND WITH THE SLAT FLAP CTL COMPUTER MISSING? UNFORTUNATELY MORE AND MORE; I SEE A CULTURE THAT IS MORE INTERESTED IN RUSHING AIRCRAFT OFF OF THE GATE RATHER THAN TAKING THE TIME TO FIX PROBLEMS CORRECTLY. I FEEL THAT THE LINE PILOT IS BECOMING THE LAST LINE OF DEFENSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.