Narrative:

I was working south local. Configuration: landing runway 14R and departing runway 27L and 22L. Three heavy (overseas) departures at runway 14R waiting for takeoff. I coordinated with north/3RD local for the release of two of the departures ahead of air carrier X. I saw air carrier Y approaching runway 27L on taxiway M and told him; 'position and hold; traffic landing and departing crossing runway.' he advised that he wasn't ready; would need about two minutes; and would wait on the runway if that was ok. I told him to advise ready. I cleared the first heavy B777 for takeoff on runway 14R and decided that there was not quite enough room to clear the second heavy; B747; ahead of air carrier X and behind the B777. I advised north/3RD local that I was only going with one heavy and that I'd re-coordinate the other two heavies. I was studying north/3RD local's traffic to figure out the best time to coordinate the release of the other runway 14R departures. At about this time air carrier Y told me he was ready for departure. I checked the runway 14R final and saw nothing. I checked the BRITE to check the range on the B777 the previous runway 14R departure; to be sure there was enough 'wake turbulence' separation; and I cleared air carrier Y for takeoff on runway 27L. I was about to ask north/3RD local for release of the runway 14R departures that were waiting when someone in the tower near me said something like; 'look out.' I saw air carrier X moving onto runway 27L with air carrier Y approaching the taxiway F at near takeoff speed. I transmitted; 'stop stop stop.' air carrier Y said; 'we've got it;' and climbed above air carrier X; missing him by about 300 ft. Air carrier Y asked; 'why didn't you hold short?' air carrier X said; 'because we weren't told to.' my biggest mistake was letting myself lose sight of the basic ATC principle: prevent collisions. In the last half hour; arrival traffic had gone from moderate to light. Air carrier X was the last arrival visible on my radar scope and my thoughts changed from separating arrs from departures to separating departures from departures. The last arrival was still active; on runway 14R; but I forgot about him. Other factors: my decision to not go with the second heavy off runway 14R let me take my focus off air carrier X much earlier than otherwise and gave me other coordination chores to take care of. The location of inbound ground blocks the view of runway 14R at the approximately location of where air carrier X was when I cleared aircraft two for takeoff. I usually work local control standing up and walking around; but I didn't walk over to look at all of runway 14R because I'd forgotten about air carrier X. The rules about arrs on runway 14R and departures on runway 27L have changed a couple times since I began working at ord. When land and hold short operations (lahso) on runway 14R with runway 27L departures was no longer authorized; it became normal for pilots and controllers to clear aircraft for takeoff on runway 27L with aircraft on landing roll on runway 14R. Also; the runway 14R reduced separation waiver (arrival more than 5000 ft from runway 27L when the departure passes) makes it normal for aircraft rolling out on runway 14R to see departures rolling on runway 27L and vice versa. If this were not a normal operation then it would be more likely for a pilot or another controller to speak up and say; 'this doesn't look right.' at the time I caused the near collision I didn't feel fatigued or sleepy. I had worked three hours of local control that day; and this was the second day of a second six day work week. The previous week had been difficult because of thunderstorms. I was probably more tired than I knew. I would like to see the FAA train controllers in simulators; with refresher training perhaps once a year. I would like this training to include a control tower version of 'cockpit resource management.' as I described; I let myself focus on the interesting puzzle of sequencing departures to the extent that I was unaware that I was causing a basic ATC error. This happened even though I was concentrating 100% on the task at hand and was not distracted by outside factors.supplemental information from acn 703941: last leg of a 4 day trip; normal single engine taxi out to runway 27L. Awaiting weights; we started the number one engine on taxiway M. Approaching runway 27L; tower cleared us into position. We responded that we were waiting on weights. We were again cleared into position on runway 27L with the instruction to let them know when we were ready. We received our weights and ran the before takeoff checklist while in position. I felt we ran our checklist in a relaxed and unhurried manner. With the checklist complete; we told tower we were ready and received our takeoff clearance. The takeoff roll was completely normal until approximately 110 KTS; when I noticed air carrier X approaching our runway on what appeared to be runway 14R or taxiway T. I commented that it didn't look like he was going to stop. I would estimate the air carrier X was traveling at 20 KTS. At that point; I did not feel we would be able to abort and stop prior to those intxns (around 110-120 KTS); so I decided to continue accelerating and if he continued encroaching; attempt to rotate over him. The other option was an abort and a right steer behind air carrier X to the north of runway 27L. Knowing there are substantial obstacles right of runway 27L; I felt that option would guarantee significant airframe damage and probably loss of life. Air carrier continued encroaching on our runway; it became clear that I would have to rotate early to clear it. By the time I rotated; air carrier X was fully on our runway. Vr at our weight was 143 KTS; and I estimate I began the rotation 10 KTS prior to vr. The first officer called V1 shortly after I started rotating. I flew a smooth rotation until we were airborne for fear of dragging the tail and delaying further rotation. Once airborne; I rotated briskly to approximately 23 to 25 degrees of pitch to maximize altitude gain. Without a frame of reference I hesitate to estimate our clearance height above air carrier X; but all three pilots in the cockpit (including the offline jumpseater) felt that it was very; very close. At approximately 400 ft to 500 ft; I remembered to raise the landing gear. From that point forward; we re-established a standard takeoff profile and continued. We had a brief discussion with tower before changing frequencys; and received a phone number to call on the ground. As a precaution I spoke with all three flight attendants to ascertain whether the passenger had heard or were party to the event; and whether they had heard any noises that would indicate we struck the tail during rotation. The flight attendants responded that they had heard no unusual noises; vibrations; or impacts during takeoff; so we deduced that we hadn't struck the tail or done any damage to the airframe. This was confirmed upon inspection after landing.supplemental information from acn 704174: landing clearance was received at approximately 9 DME for ILS runway 14R with no restrictions. During landing roll; we observed an aircraft rotating from runway 27L and passing overhead at approximately between 200 ft and 300 ft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ORD LCL CTLR CLEARS A DEP ON RWY 27L WITH AN ARRIVAL ROLLING OUT ON INTERSECTING RWY 14R.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING S LCL. CONFIGURATION: LNDG RWY 14R AND DEPARTING RWY 27L AND 22L. THREE HVY (OVERSEAS) DEPS AT RWY 14R WAITING FOR TKOF. I COORDINATED WITH NORTH/3RD LCL FOR THE RELEASE OF TWO OF THE DEPS AHEAD OF ACR X. I SAW ACR Y APCHING RWY 27L ON TXWY M AND TOLD HIM; 'POSITION AND HOLD; TFC LNDG AND DEPARTING CROSSING RWY.' HE ADVISED THAT HE WASN'T READY; WOULD NEED ABOUT TWO MINUTES; AND WOULD WAIT ON THE RWY IF THAT WAS OK. I TOLD HIM TO ADVISE READY. I CLRED THE FIRST HVY B777 FOR TKOF ON RWY 14R AND DECIDED THAT THERE WAS NOT QUITE ENOUGH ROOM TO CLR THE SECOND HVY; B747; AHEAD OF ACR X AND BEHIND THE B777. I ADVISED NORTH/3RD LCL THAT I WAS ONLY GOING WITH ONE HVY AND THAT I'D RE-COORDINATE THE OTHER TWO HEAVIES. I WAS STUDYING NORTH/3RD LCL'S TFC TO FIGURE OUT THE BEST TIME TO COORDINATE THE RELEASE OF THE OTHER RWY 14R DEPS. AT ABOUT THIS TIME ACR Y TOLD ME HE WAS READY FOR DEP. I CHKED THE RWY 14R FINAL AND SAW NOTHING. I CHKED THE BRITE TO CHK THE RANGE ON THE B777 THE PREVIOUS RWY 14R DEP; TO BE SURE THERE WAS ENOUGH 'WAKE TURB' SEPARATION; AND I CLRED ACR Y FOR TKOF ON RWY 27L. I WAS ABOUT TO ASK NORTH/3RD LCL FOR RELEASE OF THE RWY 14R DEPS THAT WERE WAITING WHEN SOMEONE IN THE TWR NEAR ME SAID SOMETHING LIKE; 'LOOK OUT.' I SAW ACR X MOVING ONTO RWY 27L WITH ACR Y APCHING THE TXWY F AT NEAR TKOF SPD. I XMITTED; 'STOP STOP STOP.' ACR Y SAID; 'WE'VE GOT IT;' AND CLBED ABOVE ACR X; MISSING HIM BY ABOUT 300 FT. ACR Y ASKED; 'WHY DIDN'T YOU HOLD SHORT?' ACR X SAID; 'BECAUSE WE WEREN'T TOLD TO.' MY BIGGEST MISTAKE WAS LETTING MYSELF LOSE SIGHT OF THE BASIC ATC PRINCIPLE: PREVENT COLLISIONS. IN THE LAST HALF HOUR; ARRIVAL TFC HAD GONE FROM MODERATE TO LIGHT. ACR X WAS THE LAST ARR VISIBLE ON MY RADAR SCOPE AND MY THOUGHTS CHANGED FROM SEPARATING ARRS FROM DEPS TO SEPARATING DEPS FROM DEPS. THE LAST ARR WAS STILL ACTIVE; ON RWY 14R; BUT I FORGOT ABOUT HIM. OTHER FACTORS: MY DECISION TO NOT GO WITH THE SECOND HVY OFF RWY 14R LET ME TAKE MY FOCUS OFF ACR X MUCH EARLIER THAN OTHERWISE AND GAVE ME OTHER COORDINATION CHORES TO TAKE CARE OF. THE LOCATION OF INBOUND GND BLOCKS THE VIEW OF RWY 14R AT THE APPROX LOCATION OF WHERE ACR X WAS WHEN I CLRED ACFT TWO FOR TKOF. I USUALLY WORK LCL CTL STANDING UP AND WALKING AROUND; BUT I DIDN'T WALK OVER TO LOOK AT ALL OF RWY 14R BECAUSE I'D FORGOTTEN ABOUT ACR X. THE RULES ABOUT ARRS ON RWY 14R AND DEPS ON RWY 27L HAVE CHANGED A COUPLE TIMES SINCE I BEGAN WORKING AT ORD. WHEN LAND AND HOLD SHORT OPS (LAHSO) ON RWY 14R WITH RWY 27L DEPS WAS NO LONGER AUTHORIZED; IT BECAME NORMAL FOR PLTS AND CTLRS TO CLR ACFT FOR TKOF ON RWY 27L WITH ACFT ON LNDG ROLL ON RWY 14R. ALSO; THE RWY 14R REDUCED SEPARATION WAIVER (ARR MORE THAN 5000 FT FROM RWY 27L WHEN THE DEP PASSES) MAKES IT NORMAL FOR ACFT ROLLING OUT ON RWY 14R TO SEE DEPS ROLLING ON RWY 27L AND VICE VERSA. IF THIS WERE NOT A NORMAL OPERATION THEN IT WOULD BE MORE LIKELY FOR A PLT OR ANOTHER CTLR TO SPEAK UP AND SAY; 'THIS DOESN'T LOOK RIGHT.' AT THE TIME I CAUSED THE NEAR COLLISION I DIDN'T FEEL FATIGUED OR SLEEPY. I HAD WORKED THREE HOURS OF LCL CTL THAT DAY; AND THIS WAS THE SECOND DAY OF A SECOND SIX DAY WORK WEEK. THE PREVIOUS WEEK HAD BEEN DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF TSTMS. I WAS PROBABLY MORE TIRED THAN I KNEW. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE FAA TRAIN CTLRS IN SIMULATORS; WITH REFRESHER TRAINING PERHAPS ONCE A YEAR. I WOULD LIKE THIS TRAINING TO INCLUDE A CTL TWR VERSION OF 'COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.' AS I DESCRIBED; I LET MYSELF FOCUS ON THE INTERESTING PUZZLE OF SEQUENCING DEPS TO THE EXTENT THAT I WAS UNAWARE THAT I WAS CAUSING A BASIC ATC ERROR. THIS HAPPENED EVEN THOUGH I WAS CONCENTRATING 100% ON THE TASK AT HAND AND WAS NOT DISTRACTED BY OUTSIDE FACTORS.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 703941: LAST LEG OF A 4 DAY TRIP; NORMAL SINGLE ENG TAXI OUT TO RWY 27L. AWAITING WTS; WE STARTED THE NUMBER ONE ENG ON TXWY M. APCHING RWY 27L; TWR CLRED US INTO POSITION. WE RESPONDED THAT WE WERE WAITING ON WTS. WE WERE AGAIN CLRED INTO POSITION ON RWY 27L WITH THE INSTRUCTION TO LET THEM KNOW WHEN WE WERE READY. WE RECEIVED OUR WTS AND RAN THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WHILE IN POSITION. I FELT WE RAN OUR CHKLIST IN A RELAXED AND UNHURRIED MANNER. WITH THE CHKLIST COMPLETE; WE TOLD TWR WE WERE READY AND RECEIVED OUR TKOF CLRNC. THE TKOF ROLL WAS COMPLETELY NORMAL UNTIL APPROX 110 KTS; WHEN I NOTICED ACR X APCHING OUR RWY ON WHAT APPEARED TO BE RWY 14R OR TXWY T. I COMMENTED THAT IT DIDN'T LOOK LIKE HE WAS GOING TO STOP. I WOULD ESTIMATE THE ACR X WAS TRAVELING AT 20 KTS. AT THAT POINT; I DID NOT FEEL WE WOULD BE ABLE TO ABORT AND STOP PRIOR TO THOSE INTXNS (AROUND 110-120 KTS); SO I DECIDED TO CONTINUE ACCELERATING AND IF HE CONTINUED ENCROACHING; ATTEMPT TO ROTATE OVER HIM. THE OTHER OPTION WAS AN ABORT AND A R STEER BEHIND ACR X TO THE N OF RWY 27L. KNOWING THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL OBSTACLES R OF RWY 27L; I FELT THAT OPTION WOULD GUARANTEE SIGNIFICANT AIRFRAME DAMAGE AND PROBABLY LOSS OF LIFE. ACR CONTINUED ENCROACHING ON OUR RWY; IT BECAME CLR THAT I WOULD HAVE TO ROTATE EARLY TO CLR IT. BY THE TIME I ROTATED; ACR X WAS FULLY ON OUR RWY. VR AT OUR WT WAS 143 KTS; AND I ESTIMATE I BEGAN THE ROTATION 10 KTS PRIOR TO VR. THE FO CALLED V1 SHORTLY AFTER I STARTED ROTATING. I FLEW A SMOOTH ROTATION UNTIL WE WERE AIRBORNE FOR FEAR OF DRAGGING THE TAIL AND DELAYING FURTHER ROTATION. ONCE AIRBORNE; I ROTATED BRISKLY TO APPROX 23 TO 25 DEGS OF PITCH TO MAXIMIZE ALT GAIN. WITHOUT A FRAME OF REFERENCE I HESITATE TO ESTIMATE OUR CLRNC HEIGHT ABOVE ACR X; BUT ALL THREE PLTS IN THE COCKPIT (INCLUDING THE OFFLINE JUMPSEATER) FELT THAT IT WAS VERY; VERY CLOSE. AT APPROX 400 FT TO 500 FT; I REMEMBERED TO RAISE THE LNDG GEAR. FROM THAT POINT FORWARD; WE RE-ESTABLISHED A STANDARD TKOF PROFILE AND CONTINUED. WE HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH TWR BEFORE CHANGING FREQS; AND RECEIVED A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL ON THE GND. AS A PRECAUTION I SPOKE WITH ALL THREE FLT ATTENDANTS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE PAX HAD HEARD OR WERE PARTY TO THE EVENT; AND WHETHER THEY HAD HEARD ANY NOISES THAT WOULD INDICATE WE STRUCK THE TAIL DURING ROTATION. THE FLT ATTENDANTS RESPONDED THAT THEY HAD HEARD NO UNUSUAL NOISES; VIBRATIONS; OR IMPACTS DURING TKOF; SO WE DEDUCED THAT WE HADN'T STRUCK THE TAIL OR DONE ANY DAMAGE TO THE AIRFRAME. THIS WAS CONFIRMED UPON INSPECTION AFTER LNDG.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 704174: LNDG CLRNC WAS RECEIVED AT APPROX 9 DME FOR ILS RWY 14R WITH NO RESTRICTIONS. DURING LNDG ROLL; WE OBSERVED AN ACFT ROTATING FROM RWY 27L AND PASSING OVERHEAD AT APPROX BETWEEN 200 FT AND 300 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.