Narrative:

Flight planning was routine. Upon arrival at the cockpit we had a significant deferral to deal with concerning the engine start. The deferral was prosv inoperative and deactivated. The cockpit crew reviewed the MEL and the FM checklist. I spoke with the mechanic and he assured me that he was familiar with the procedure and that we should plan on starting #2 at the gate. The first officers and I performed the applicable FM checklist and followed the MEL instructions. During the engine start; the mechanic on the headset was uncooperative and in a rush. In his haste he forgot a required step in the MEL checklist. As per step in the MEL procedures; I told the mechanic to close the prsov at 45-50% N2. The mechanic skipped his step; 'select associated engine bleed switch off when requested by ground crew to enable them to secure the prsov closed.' the ground crew did not make this request. The pilots could not complete the item properly because of the mechanics omission. The mechanic got off of the headset before I could confirm that the 'prsov was locked closed'. The MEL also states that 'one of the following will be displayed' (status) engine 2 start vlv (this status message was never displayed). After the engine start; the first officers and I discussed these two discrepancies. We immediately called maintenance and requested that we perform a re-start of #2 at our present position so we could properly and quickly complete the correct MEL procedures. Maintenance was unable or unwilling to respond in a timely manner. This delay caused us to have to move out of the alley and taxi for almost one hour due to local traffic and conversations with maintenance. Maintenance requested that we return to a gate to try a restart of #2; and to address a new EICAS message (bleed hp engine 2). Upon arrival at the gate we experienced further delays due to the requirement to tow 400's into the gate. At the gate I immediately contacted dispatch to discuss our maintenance and fuel status. We had burned 5;000 pounds of fuel during our taxi; and considering the fact that maintenance could not assure us that we would not experience the same problems during our subsequent taxi out; the dispatcher and I mutually agreed to add this same 5;000 pounds of fuel. After a long delay maintenance arrived in the cockpit. A heated discussion occurred between the pilots and the original mechanic; who denied improperly following the MEL start items. This mechanic was out of line when he inappropriately told first officer to 'shut up.' during this time period the cockpit crew did not receive any information regarding the length of our delay or the status of our maintenance issues. Things appeared to be moving at a very slow pace. I tried to keep the passengers informed as well as I could. Later the flight attendant crew went illegal and was swapped with the another outbound crew. The first officer crew was also scheduled to go illegal. The trip was built as a single augmented crew; and had only 1.5 hours of leeway. A third first officer was called from home to create a double augmented crew (which took 3+ hours). I don't think it is legal or safe to change an identification from one to two augmented crews in the middle of a trip. We came to work expecting a maximum actual duty day of 15.5 hours; then after several hours of duty it was increased to 19.5 hours of duty. After 6.5 hours of intense work in an extremely hot cockpit the thought of a 12 hour flight was daunting and fatiguing to say the least. I was already very tired; and we hadn't even taken off. Within minutes of going illegal again; (exceeding the 19.5 hours of duty) customer service canceled the flight. In my opinion the flight could have been saved if either of the following had occurred. Better 400 maintenance (the prsov had been deferred for 5 days). Or; if maintenance could have responded in a timely manner to the crews request for assistance immediately after push back.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 with a MEL'ed PRSOV required a Mechanic to close the bleed valve at 45% but after start the flight crew could not confirm that action was taken and so returned to the gate only to have the flight canceled because of a lengthy delay.

Narrative: Flight planning was routine. Upon arrival at the cockpit we had a significant Deferral to deal with concerning the engine start. The deferral was PROSV inoperative and deactivated. The cockpit crew reviewed the MEL and the FM checklist. I spoke with the Mechanic and he assured me that he was familiar with the procedure and that we should plan on starting #2 at the gate. The first officers and I performed the applicable FM checklist and followed the MEL instructions. During the engine start; the Mechanic on the headset was uncooperative and in a rush. In his haste he forgot a required step in the MEL checklist. As per step in the MEL procedures; I told the Mechanic to close the PRSOV at 45-50% N2. The Mechanic skipped his step; 'Select associated engine bleed switch off when requested by ground crew to enable them to secure the PRSOV closed.' The ground crew did not make this request. The pilots could not complete the item properly because of the mechanics omission. The Mechanic got off of the headset before I could confirm that the 'PRSOV was locked closed'. The MEL also states that 'one of the following WILL be displayed' (status) ENG 2 START VLV (this status message was never displayed). After the engine start; the first officers and I discussed these two discrepancies. We immediately called Maintenance and requested that we perform a re-start of #2 at our present position so we could properly and quickly complete the correct MEL procedures. Maintenance was unable or unwilling to respond in a timely manner. This delay caused us to have to move out of the alley and taxi for almost one hour due to local traffic and conversations with maintenance. Maintenance requested that we return to a gate to try a restart of #2; and to address a new EICAS message (BLEED HP ENG 2). Upon arrival at the gate we experienced further delays due to the requirement to tow 400's into the gate. At the gate I immediately contacted dispatch to discuss our maintenance and fuel status. We had burned 5;000 LBS of fuel during our taxi; and considering the fact that Maintenance could not assure us that we would not experience the same problems during our subsequent taxi out; the Dispatcher and I mutually agreed to add this same 5;000 LBS of fuel. After a long delay Maintenance arrived in the cockpit. A heated discussion occurred between the pilots and the original Mechanic; who denied improperly following the MEL start items. This mechanic was out of line when he inappropriately told First Officer to 'shut up.' During this time period the cockpit crew did not receive any information regarding the length of our delay or the status of our maintenance issues. Things appeared to be moving at a very slow pace. I tried to keep the passengers informed as well as I could. Later the flight attendant crew went illegal and was swapped with the another outbound crew. The first officer crew was also scheduled to go illegal. The trip was built as a single augmented crew; and had only 1.5 hours of leeway. A third First Officer was called from home to create a double augmented crew (which took 3+ hours). I don't think it is legal or safe to change an ID from one to two augmented crews in the middle of a trip. We came to work expecting a maximum actual duty day of 15.5 hours; then after several hours of duty it was increased to 19.5 hours of duty. After 6.5 hours of intense work in an extremely hot cockpit the thought of a 12 hour flight was daunting and fatiguing to say the least. I was already very tired; and we hadn't even taken off. Within minutes of going illegal again; (exceeding the 19.5 hours of duty) customer service canceled the flight. In my opinion the flight could have been saved if either of the following had occurred. Better 400 maintenance (the PRSOV had been deferred for 5 days). Or; if Maintenance could have responded in a timely manner to the crews request for assistance immediately after push back.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.